Package Inserts for Prescription Drugs as Evidence in
Medical Malpractice Suits
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires drug manufacturers to accompany shipments of prescription drugs with "package inserts" that describe the drug, summarize its possible beneficial and harmful effects on the patient, and give the doctor directions for its use.' The insert is directed to the prescribing physician
and is not seen by the patient. 2 The information on the insert is
potentially important evidence in trials to determine who should
IThe legal provisions that govern package inserts for prescription drugs are found in a
somewhat confused mixture of statutes and regulations. Section 502(f) of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act provides that a drug is "misbranded" if its labeling does not contain
"adequate directions for use" and adequate warnings against possible hazards, but a proviso
allows the Secretary to exempt certain drugs from the "directions for use" requirement if he
determines that such information is "not necessary for the protection of the public health."
21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (1970). Section 503(b) of the Act defines which drugs require prescriptions
and exempts drugs dispensed by prescription from the requirements of section 502(f) if the
labeling contains, among other things, the directions for use and any cautionary statements
contained in the doctor's prescription. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1970). The FDA takes the position
that "prescription drugs" are still subject to the requirements of section 502(f) until they are
"dispensed by prescription," and the agency has used the § 502(f) proviso as a basis for
promulgating regulations on prescription drug labeling. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c) (1976). This
rather awkward use of authority exempts a drug from the "directions for use" requirement if
its labeling contains not only directions for use, but the more extensive information required
by the FDA's regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.100 (1976).
2 Although doctors usually do not see the inserts mailed with drug shipments, the insert
information for most drugs is printed at the manufacturer's expense in the Physician'sDesk
Reference (PDR), which is published annually and supplemented quarterly by Medical Economics. The PDR is distributed free of charge to all licensed physicians.
The package dispensed by prescription to the patient is exempted from the labeling
requirements of § 502(f) by § 503(b)(2). 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2) (1970). Nevertheless, the FDA
has recently proposed and issued regulations requiring package inserts directed to patients.
E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 310.501-.501a (1976) (patient package information for oral and injectable
contraceptives); 40 Fed. Reg. 15,392, 15,397 (1975) (proposing 21 C.F.R. § 1.112(c)(6)(ii),
which would require information for the patient to be listed on the package insert for physicians as a precaution). The FDA has defended patient package inserts by arguing that the
provisions of § 505 of the Act, giving the agency authority to ensure that drugs are safe and
that labeling is not "misleading," overcome the provision that exempts drugs dispensed by
prescription from the labeling requirements of § 502(f). The Commissioner asserts that requiring printed patient information does not conflict with the purpose of the § 503(b)(2) exemption, i.e., to avoid self-diagnosis and self-treatment, since the patients must have a prescription to get the drugs in the first place. 40 Fed. Reg. 15,394 (1975). See generally Barrows,
PrescriptionDrug Labeling for Patients,30 FooD, DRUG & CosM. L.J. 50 (1975); Goldstein,
Drug Package Inserts for Patients, Tam, Feb. 1977, at 55; Joubert & Lasagna, Patient
Package Inserts (pts. 1 & 2), 18 CN. PHARM. & THERAPEUTIcs 507, 663 (1975); Rheingold,
ProductsLiability: The Ethical DrugManufacturer'sLiability, 18 RuTGFmS L. REv. 947, 98587 (1964).
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bear the loss when the use of a prescription drug has allegedly injured a patient. Inserts are accepted as critical evidence of whether
a drug manufacturer has fulfilled its duty to warn the prescribers
and users of its potentially hazardous product.3 This comment investigates the more controversial role of package inserts as evidence
in a malpractice suit against the prescribing doctor.
The recent developments in medical malpractice litigation
make an analysis of the proper role of package inserts particularly
timely. Courts have traditionally measured the standard of care in
medical malpractice trials by the customary practice of physicians
in the defendant's community and have required that the standard
of care and causation be proved by expert testimony.4 However,
growing doubts over the justification for these special rules and
concern over the difficulty plaintiffs have experienced in acquiring
expert testimony-a phenomenon blamed by some on a "conspiracy
of silence" among doctors unwilling to testify against each
other 5-have led to an erosion of the preferred status of medical
defendants.' In suits involving prescription drugs, package inserts
offer plaintiffs and courts an attractive alternative to the traditional
professional standard of care rule and expert testimony requirement. Inserts are related to aspects of the prescription decision that
appear more amenable to objective resolution than other medical
See, e.g., McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974);
Merrill, Compensationfor PrescriptionDrugInjuries, 59 VA. L. Rav. 1, 39-49 (1973); Rheingold, supra note 2, 965-70, 982-1009.
See text and note at note 164 infra.
See, e.g., Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1
ViiL. L. REv. 250 (1956); Kayajanian, Confrontingthe Conspiracyof Silence: We Have a Tiger
by the Tail, 6 U.W.L.A.L. Rav. 40 (1974).
1 This trend is reflected in the expanded requirement of informed consent, see, e.g.,
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d
1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Trogun v.
Fructman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973); Comment, New Trends in Informed
Consent? 54 NEB. L. Rav. 66 (1975), the movement toward a national standard of care, see,
e.g., Pederson v. Dumochel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967), the increased use of the
"common knowledge" and "res ipsa loquitur" exceptions to the expert testimony requirement, see, e.g., Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903
(1968); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Annot., 82 A.L.R. 2d 1262
(1962), and the willingness of some courts to assume the task of setting the standard of care,
see, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974); note 166 infra. See generally
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 87 (1976);
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. Rav. 549 (1959); Note,
Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HAv. L. REv. 333 (1963); Note, Overcoming the
"Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and Common-Law Innovations, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 1019
(1961); Comment, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 834 (1966);
Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. Rav. 729
(1970).
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judgments; a drug manufacturer may be better informed of the
qualities of its product than most doctors; and the federal government's participation in the preparation of inserts lends them an
aura of authority. Several courts have responded to these characteristics and, with support from commentators, have granted inserts
special status as evidence in cases involving the alleged misuse of
prescription drugs.7 However, neither the courts nor the commentators have adequately identified and analyzed the questions raised
by the use of inserts as evidence.
This comment attempts to fill the analytical gaps in the case
discussions by examining the inserts, articulating the arguments for
and against their use as evidence, and suggesting how courts can use
inserts to minimize the conflicts between safeguarding the prescribing doctor's informed, independent judgment and protecting the
patient's right to nonnegligent treatment.
I.

THE JUDIcIAL TREATMENT OF INSERT EVIDENCE

The plaintiff in a malpractice suit must prove that the doctor
owed him a duty to exercise a standard of care which the doctor
failed to meet, and that this failure caused him the damages he
seeks to recover.' Inserts have usually been introduced by plaintiffs
to prove the proper standard of care owed by the defendant doctor,
but the insert information is also relevant to the plaintiff's proof of
causation, and could be used defensively by doctors on both the
9
standard of care and causation issues.
The cases that consider how to treat package inserts in suits
against prescribing doctors reveal a variety of approaches. Some
courts have avoided deciding how to treat insert evidence by finding
that a proper foundation for admission had not been laid,1" or that
See, e.g., Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970); Mueller
v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 39 (S.D. 1974); Merrill, supranote 3, at 52-65; Pruzan, Prescription
DrugLiability in the Context of Washington Law, 9 GONZAGA L. Ray. 707 (1974).
8 W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 143 (4th ed. 1971).
See text and notes at notes 176-79 infra.
1*See, e.g., Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1972) (insert most relied on
by plaintiff not in effect when the drug was used); Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897
(D.D.C. 1963) (insert information introduced in the form of manufacturer's answer to an
interrogatory, without copies or proof of circulation, was inadmissible against defendant
doctor); Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 67 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474 (Dist. Ct. App.) (no proper foundation laid, no offer of proof made when objection sustained), rev'd on other grounds, 69 Cal.
2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968); Allen v. Leonard, 270 Cal. App. 2d 209, 75
Cal. Rptr. 840 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (pamphlet in evidence printed and circulated after
prescription). If the insert is introduced on the issue of causation, it will be relevant even if
published after the treatment in question.
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the exclusion or admission of the insert had not been prejudicial. 1
A number of courts have recognized that inserts, like medical treatises, are hearsay evidence if used to prove the truth of the statements they contain. 12 Some of these courts have avoided the hearsay
objection by admitting the inserts to prove something other than the
truth of the statements they contain.13 Other courts have held inserts admissible as evidence of the standard of care without explicitly mentioning the hearsay rule. These decisions have focused on
the proper weight to assign inserts in light of the policies governing
the rules of liability and evidence in malpractice suits. 4
The earlier cases allowing plaintiffs to introduce insert evidence
exhibit caution and reluctance in departing from the traditional rule
that the standard of care is determined by expert testimony defining
the customary practice of the professional community involved. In
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 5 for
example, the plaintiff introduced insert information on the proper
dosage of a drug that had allegedly been administered to him in
excessive amounts. The court held that the insert was admissible,
but for a limited purpose: it "cannot establish as a matter of law
the standard of care required of a physician in the use of a drug."'"
Later cases have expanded the role of inserts as evidence of the
standard of care, but these cases have sometimes involved extreme
facts. 7 Several of the decisions expanding the role of inserts as evidence have involved the drug Chloromycetin (chloramphenicol).
This drug, an antibiotic effective against a wide range of bacteria,
,1E.g., Marsh v. Arnold, 446 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (exclusion of insert
from evidence held nonprejudicial where insert had been used extensively in crossexamination).
12E.g., Allen v. Leonard, 270 Cal. App. 2d 209, 218-219, 75 Cal. Rptr. 840, 847 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (dictum).
'1 See, e.g., Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961); Koury v. Follo 272
N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968); text and notes at notes 105-11 infra.
1,See, e.g., Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho
413, 272 P.2d 718 (1954).
11 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
1 Id. at 557, 317 P.2d at 180. Defendant and amicus briefs had warned that inserts were
conservative and quickly outdated, and that medical progress could be significantly impaired
"if physicians were required to follow blindly the suggestions of the manufacturers who
prepare but do not use [drugs]." Id.
I? See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) (mother administered
Chloromycetin to her child without a doctor's supervision after lying to a doctor to obtain a
renewal of the prescription; insert information warning against "indiscriminate use" of the
drug, together with independent medical testimony, overcame a defense based on the custom
of the profession).
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became quite popular among doctors after extensive promotion by
the manufacturer.' 8 The drug's broad effectiveness made it appear
an attractive remedy for many minor infections since a doctor could
often assume that it would work without having to identify the
particular bacteria involved. However, clinical experience with the
drug revealed that it induced fatal aplastic anemia in a small percentage of recipients.
Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co.," currently the leading decision
on insert evidence in medical malpractice trials, involved a patient
who had died of aplastic anemia after receiving Chloromycetin for
an ear infection. The insert warnings clearly linked the drug with
fatal cases of aplastic anemia and recommended that its use be
restricted to serious illnesses where other drugs were ineffective.
Adequate blood studies during treatment were termed "essential.""9
The plaintiff alleged that the doctor had been negligent in prescribing such a dangerous drug, in prescribing a dose too low to cure the
infection and prolonging treatment, and in failing to perform adequate blood tests.2' The Minnesota Supreme Court began its opinion by criticizing the medical profession for making it difficult for
plaintiffs to secure qualified expert testimony in malpractice actions. The plaintiff had called three experts, but none was currently
practicing in the community, and the trial court had stricken much
of their testimony. One expert had testified that the proper practice
for a doctor not familiar with a drug was to follow the manufacturer's advice. The high court, reversing the trial court's ruling, held
that this testimony was "perfectly competent" and noted that "the
manufacturer does have a far better opportunity than the ordinary
practitioner to know and understand how and when its own product
should be used. ' 2 The supreme court upset a directed verdict for
the defendant, finding the evidence on the professional standard of
care "not strong," but "adequate to make a prima facie case. Where
the dosage is prescribed by the manufacturer, testimony of the physician's failure to adhere to its recommendation is sufficient evi, The PeculiarSuccess of Chloromycetin, 35 CONSUMER REP. 616 (1970).
, 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970).
Id. at 334-35, 181 N.W.2d at 884-85. For a copy of the Chloromycetin insert, revised
as of 1968 and obtained from a pharmacy shelf in June, 1977, see Appendix infra.
2, The defendant had found that Chloromycetin was the most effective of fifteen drugs
he tested on the bacteria responsible for the infection, and prescribed a dosage lower than
that recommended in the insert. The doctor performed a blood test once in the six months
during which the patient received five four-day prescriptions of the drug. Id. at 333-34, 181
N.W.2d 884.
22 Id. at 338, 181 N.W.2d at 887.
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dence to require him to explain the reason for his deviation. '3
In response to an amicus petition for rehearing and clarification
filed by the state medical association, the court summarized the
rules it intended to follow in the future:
Where a drug manufacturer recommends to the medical
profession (1) the conditions under which its drug should be
prescribed; (2) the disorders it is designed to relieve; (3) the
precautionary measures which should be observed; and (4)
warns of the dangers which are inherent in its use, a doctor's
deviation from such recommendations is prima facie evidence
of negligence if there is competent medical testimony that his
patient's injury or death resulted from the doctor's failure to
adhere to the recommendations.
Under such circumstances, it is incumbent on the doctor
to disclose his reasons for departing from the procedures recommended by the manufacturer. Although it will ordinarily be a
jury question whether the doctor has justified or excused his
deviation, there may be situations where as a matter of law the
explanation exonerates him unless rebutted by other competent medical testimony.24
The pattern of reasoning in Mulder resembles that in earlier
cases broadening the admissibility of inserts: concern about the
inequities resulting from the expert testimony requirement 5 leads
to an attempt to aid plaintiffs by giving more weight to the package
insert. Mulder advances the prior case law in several respects. The
court's rules attempt to define what aspects of insert information
are relevant to the proper standard of care and to clarify the weight
to be given insert evidence and the possibility of rebutting such
evidence. The opinion is conclusory, however, and raises as many
questions as it answers. The court does not adequately discuss why
inserts should be given this special status. The four things inserts
must "do" to qualify are ambiguous, and the reasons for the particular requirements are not explained. A doctor may defend his departure from the insert, but the opinion offers neither examples of such
23

Id. at 339, 181 N.W.2d at 887.

24

Id. at 339-40, 181 N.W.2d at 887-88.

See, e.g., Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 418-19, 272 P.2d 718, 721 (1954) (court
admitting an insert as "prima facie proof of a proper method of use" of a drug notes allegations that two of plaintiff's expert witnesses had withdrawn their willingness to testify under
pressure from a medical society); Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134-38, 167 A.2d 625, 62832 (1961) (court allowed insert to prove knowledge of the dangers associated with the drug,
noting that the plaintiff had been unable to obtain qualified experts from the community).
"
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a defense nor a rationale for evaluating asserted defenses. Inserts are
treated as prima facie evidence of the standard of care, but the court
requires independent expert testimony on the causation issue without explaining the basis for this distinction.
Although Mulder has been hailed as the wave of the future,"
only two jurisdictions 2 have followed the case. Indeed, a recent case
from the Minnesota Supreme Court suggests that Mulder is being
reexamined. In Lhotka v. Larson,2 a closely divided court affirmed
the refusal of a trial judge to give a Mulder instruction. The defendant doctor had prescribed small doses of Seconal, Demerol, and
Phenergan for a woman in labor. The woman's child, born prematurely, was given a low chance of survival at birth, suffered a number of cyanotic episodes, and was diagnosed as severely mentally
retarded and physically handicapped. The plaintiff claimed that
Seconal was contraindicated in cases of premature labor and that
the doses of Demerol and Phenergan were excessive. In the absence
of a Mulder instruction, the jury found for the defendant. The supreme court affirmed on the ground that the doctor had not clearly
departed from any unambiguous manufacturer's instructions. Although injections of Seconal were contraindicated under the circumstances, the drug had been administered orally, and the recommendations on oral administration contained no such contraindication. To support its affirmance, the court emphasized that the
plaintiff had been able to secure adequate expert testimony,29 and
that since there were at least six possible causes of the child's condition, the "facts of the case suggest quite strongly that the jury
verdict would have been no different even if a Mulder instruction
"1See Boland,

FederalRegulation of PrescriptionDrug Advertising and Labeling, 12

B.C. INDus. & COM. L. Rxv. 203, 244-48 (1970); Merrill, supra note 3, at 62-65; Peck, FDA
Approval: When Should Your Judgment OutweighIt? CURRENT PRESCRMING, December, 1975,
at 26; Pruzan, supra note 7, at 730-31.
27 In Ohligschager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d 411, 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973),
the Illinois Supreme Court followed Mulder to hold that insert instructions for the proper
administration of a drug and warnings of its potential hazards were sufficient to take the
negligence issue to the jury. The court did not adopt the Mulder rule requiring expert testimony to prove causation. However, the opinion notes that the plaintiff had provided expert
testimony that the defendant's actions were one possible cause of the injury.
In Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 39 (S.D. 1974), the South Dakota Supreme Court gave
a strong endorsement to the Mulder approach:
[T]hese manufacturers' recommendations on the use of drugs are not only admissible
but essential in determining the possible lack of care of a doctor where the issue involved
is injury from the administration of a drug. We see no reason for the courts to hesitate
to use a standard so widely and favorably used in the medical profession.
Id. at 43.
21 238 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1976).
" Id. at 875 n.17.
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had been given."30 The full significance of Lhotka's limitation on a
plaintiff's use of insert evidence is unclear, but the tone of the opinion contrasts sharply with that of Mulder and its progeny."
The cases reveal that the courts have not adequately analyzed
the use of inserts in medical malpractice trials. A few opinions have
relied on assumptions about the quality of inserts and the use doctors make of them,32 but no opinion examines the actual process by
which particular information is placed on the insert, or even refers
to the statutes or regulations governing the preparation of inserts.
Such an examination is necessary to assess the reliability of insert
evidence and the arguments for and against its use.
H.

THE INSERTS

The admissibility and proper role of inserts in medical malpractice trials turn in part on an evaluation of the reliability of inserts
as guides for doctors. That reliability is determiried by the process
that produces inserts and is reflected in the role they play in medical practice.
A.

The Insert Preparation Process

Congress designed the regulatory structure that governs package inserts to correct perceived deficiencies and abuses in the production and marketing of drugs. The 1938 Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act33 and the 1962 amendments to that Act 34 were passed
after well-publicized tragedies involving Sulfanilomide s and Thalidomide 36 in an effort to prevent future calamities by improving the
Id. at 875.
See id. at 877-78 (Chanak, J., dissenting).
32 E.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (inserts are not current, are overcautious, and are viewed by
doctors as merely supplemental to their clinical experience in prescribing the drug); Julien
v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272 P.2d 718 (1954) (inserts are reliable because they are prepared
by manufacturers with an incentive to be accurate to avoid liability for failure to warn);
Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 39 (S.D. 1974) (inserts are "essential" evidence because of
rapid technological advances in drugs, the testing requirements imposed on manufacturers
and their potential liability, and the practical necessity for doctors to rely on inserts in
prescribing).
3 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392
(1970)).
m Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. 87-781, tit. I, §§ 102(b)-102(d), 103(a)-103(b), 104(a)104(d)(2), 76 Stat. 781-83, 784, 785 [hereinafter cited as 1962 Drug Amendments].
3 See SECRETARY OF AGRIcULTuRE, REPORT ON DFATHs DuE TO Euxm SULFANLAMMDMASSENGILL, S. Doc. No. 124, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in C. DUNN, FEDERAL
FOOD, DRUG, AND COsMETIc ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITs LEGISLATE RECORD 1316 (1938).
31 See Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation? 18 RUTGERS L. REv.
101, 115 (1963).
3'
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manufacturing, testing, and labeling of drugs." The premise of this
legislation is that a federal agency is necessary to protect consumers
from the products of a profit-seeking drug industry anxious to increase its sales. This premise, which has recently come under severe
attack,38 together with the relative difficulty of obtaining controlled
experimental data on the adverse effects of drugs, explains the general "negative" or cautious bias of FDA regulations and practices.
Manufacturers bear the initiative in developing new drugs or new
uses for old drugs, and introducing a new drug or changing an insert
in a way that will increase sales is much more difficult than withdrawing a drug or changing an insert in a way that will decrease
sales.
Since a 1906 prohibition against drug labeling that was "false
or misleading in any particular, ' 39 inserts have become increasingly
sophisticated, and the government's role in preparing them has constantly expanded. The history of package inserts" reflects trends
3 See S. REP. No. 91, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1962). See generally Note, The DrugAmendments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1082; Note,
The Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation? 18 RUomRS L. REv. 101 (1963).
31The continuing trend toward government control of the development and use of prescription medicines has stimulated interest in criticisms of the basic assumptions underlying
the regulatory structure. Studies of the effects of the 1962 amendments question the fundamental proposition that increasing the power of an institutionally and politically cautious
agency has improved the public welfare. Critics of the amendments point out the reduced
rate of innovation since 1962 and assert that the interests of those patients who are harmed
by delay and by the absence of new breakthroughs are inadequately represented in the
present scheme. See generally DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETING (ed. R. Helms 1975);
REGULATING NEW DRUGS (ed. R. Landau 1973); W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, REGULATION AND
DRUG DEVELOPMENT (1975).
These issues have recently been highlighted by controversies over the approval of drugs
used widely outside the United States to treat heart disease and cancer. See Legalizing
Laetril, NEwswEEK, May 3, 1977, at 74; Wall St. J., March 7, 1977, at 1,col. 1. Court decisions
allowing Laetril, a drug the FDA has refused to approve, to be imported for the treatment of
cancer and state legislation designed to achieve the same purpose present a serious challenge
to the basic premises of the federal drug laws. See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d
1137 (10th Cir. 1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 10,066 (1977).
3'Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. Section 7, defining the term adulterated,
and § 8,defining the term misbranded, were the most relevant to labeling. Section 8 was
amended to provide specifically that drugs bearing labels with false or misleading statements
about therapeutic or curative effects would be deemed misbranded. Act of August 23, 1912,
ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416. For regulations on labeling issued under the 1906 Act, see C. DUNN,
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COsMEnIC AcT: A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE REcoRD 1348-54
(1938).
1' The history of drug labeling statutes and regulations since the 1938 Act can be traced
as follows: labeling regulations pursuant to the proviso of § 502(f) were issued in 1938. 3 Fed.
Reg.3168 (1938) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 2.106(b)(2) (Supp. 1938)). Revised regulations were
promulgated in 1944. 9 Fed. Reg. 12,255 (1944) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 2.106(b) (1946)). In
1951 the Act was amended to define "prescription drug" more specifically and to exempt
drugs "dispensed by prescription" from the labeling requirements. Act of Oct. 26, 1951, ch.
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toward clearer definitions of the categories of required information
578, § 1, 65 Stat. 648 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1970)). New labeling regulations were
promulgated in 1952. 17 Fed. Reg. 6818 (1952) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b) (1954)). A
major revision of labeling regulations in 1960-61 produced the language that still provides the
basic regulatory authority for requiring package inserts in prescription drugs. 26 Fed. Reg.
8389 (1961) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b)(3) (1963)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. §
201.100(c) (1976)). Later changes and clarifications of this language were made at 27 Fed.
Reg. 1317 (1962); 33 Fed. Reg. 15,023 (1968); 37 Fed. Reg. 3176 (1972); and 40 Fed. Reg. 13,996
(1975). The 1961 revision also clarified ambiguities concerning dosage information, 26 Fed.
Reg. 12,518 (1961) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 3514 (1963)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 201.55
(1976)), and added an exemption for commonly known drugs, 26 Fed. Reg. 12,563 (1961), as
amended, 27 Fed. Reg. 5428 (1962), as amended, 36 Fed. Reg. 18377 (1971) (codified at 21
C.F.R. § 3.515 (1963)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 201.60 (1976)). A provision for special
mailings to doctors was included in 1967. 32 Fed. Reg. 7127 (1967), as amended, 33 Fed. Reg.
12,139 (1968) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 3.501 (1969)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 200.5
(1976)). Regulations establishing a uniform format for inserts were issued in 1970. 35 Fed.
Reg. 2656 (1970) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 3.74 (1970)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 201.56
(1976)). Further regulations were proposed in 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,504 (1972), and in 1975.
40 Fed. Reg. 15,392 (1975).
Until the most recent proposed regulations, the strength of support required for insert
information was determined by the regulations governing the approval of new drugs, rather
than the regulations on labeling. Regulations on New Drug Applications (NDAs) were issued
in 1938, 3 Fed. Reg. 1847 (1938) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 2.110 (Supp. 1938)), as amended, 3
Fed. Reg. 3161 (1938), as amended, 6 Fed. Reg. 1921 (1942). These regulations were revised
in 1944, 9 Fed. Reg. 12,256 (1944) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1.110(b)(2)(3) (1946)), and again
in 1956. 21 Fed. Reg. 5576 (1956) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.1-.32 (1958)). The 1962 Drug
Amendments had a significant impact on the level of support required and available for insert
statements, and regulations partially implementing the amendments were issued in 1963. 28
Fed. Reg. 6377 (1963) (see in particular sections codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.4(c) (1963)
(current version at 21 C.F.R. § 314.1(c) (1976)); and 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.13, .27(c)(1) (1963)
(current version at 21 C.F.R. § 310.300 (1976)). The 1962 amendments did not affect the
labeling of drugs approved before 1962 until after the Drug Efficacy Study (DES), prepared
by the National Academy of Science and the National Research Council under contract with
the FDA, was submitted in 1969. See generally Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug
Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185 (1971). This study classified and evaluated previously approved drugs and drug labeling according to the criteria established by the 1962 amendments,
and made recommendations about the quality and preparation of package inserts. See,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DRUG EFFICACY STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE COMMISSION OF FOOD

AND DRUGS, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

11-15, 241-43 (1969). To implement these findings

and recommendations, the FDA established a "summary judgment" procedure based on its
interpretation of the requirement for "substantial evidence" of effectiveness. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.111(a) (5) (requirements for "well controlled studies"); id. § 314.200(d) (summary judgment procedure) (1976); Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Amendments, supra, at 214-22.
The FDA also established a "class hearing" approach, under which the status of all identical,
related, or similar drugs could be determined in a single hearing. 37 Fed. Reg. 23,187 (1972)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.40 (1973)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 310.6 (1976)). The major
regulatory innovations growing out of the DES were upheld by the Supreme Court in four
decisions in 1973. USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973); Weinberger
v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640
(1973); Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); see 1973 Court
Cases Involving Rule-Making: Implications for Federal Regulation, 28 FOOD & DRUG COSM.
L.J. 661 (1973).
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and of the support necessary for each category,4 higher requirements for support for certain categories of information," more extensive records and reports related to insert information,43 that uniform format for all inserts and of information required on inserts for
similar or identical drugs," an increased use of expert advice from
authorities outside the agency, 5 and an elimination of exceptions to
the insert requirements coupled with an expansion of full FDA authority over almost all prescription drugs." These trends are reflected in both present agency practices and proposed reforms.
Present FDA regulations require that labeling on or within the
package of a prescription drug contain
adequate information for its use, including indications, effects,
dosages, routes, methods, and frequency and duration of administration, and any relevant hazards, contraindications, side
effects, and precautions under which practitioners licensed by
law to administer the drug can use the drug safely and for the
purposes for which it is advertised or represented.4 7
Another labeling regulation, designed to make inserts more orderly
and uniform, sets out ten mandatory and three optional categories
of information.
The original insert for a new drug49 is approved as part of the
"1 See, e.g., 35 Fed. Reg. 2656 (1970) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (1976)); 40 Fed. Reg.
15,392 (1975).
41 See, e.g., 1962 Drug Amendments, supra note 34, § 102(c), amending 21 U.S.C. §

355(d) (1970) (adding the requirement of "substantial evidence" for claims of effectiveness);
28 Fed. Reg. 6378-79 (1963) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.4(c) (1963)) (specifying in greater
detail than before the tests required in a New Drug Application).
43 See, e.g., 1962 Drug Amendments, supra note 34, § 103(a), adding 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)
(1970); 28 Fed. Reg. 6377 (1963) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.13, .27(c)(1) (1963)) (current
C.F.R. § 130.40 (1973)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 310.6 (1976)).
'4 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 2 supra; 37 Fed. Reg. 23,187 (1972) (codified at 21
C.F.R. § 130.40 (1973)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 310.6 (1976)).
" See generally Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administration,
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974).
1' For example, the FDA's broad interpretation of what drugs are subject to regulation
as "new drugs" was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1973. Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 623-27 (1973); see note 49 infra.
47 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1) (1976).
21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (1976). The mandatory headings are: description, actions, indications, contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, dosage and administration, overdosage (where applicable), and how supplied. The optional ones are: animal pharmacology and toxicology, clinical studies, and references. A sample insert is printed in the
Appendix.
41 The 1938 Act defined two categories of "new drug":
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New Drug Application (NDA)50 submitted by the manufacturer to
the FDA. The NDA and the proposed insert are based on tests the
drug company develops and administers according to criteria in the
statute and regulations. The statute sets out two different testing
requirements. The safety of the drug must be shown by "adequate
tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not
such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof," while
efficacy must be proved by "substantial evidence that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the condi(1) "any drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
safety of drugs, as safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, except. . .[drugs subject to the 1906 Act whose labeling
contained the same representations regarding conditions for use];" (2) "[any drug
which has become recognized as required under [(1)] but which has not, otherwise than
in such investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material time under such
conditions."
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 201(p), 52 Stat. 1041-42. The 1962 amendments added the
requirement of efficacy to that of safety. Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. 87-781, tit. I, §§
102(a)(1), (2), 76 Stat. 781. The section is presently codified as 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1970).
The regulations defining "new drug" have remained constant since 1939. Regulations
first defined four sources of "newness": newness for drug use of a (1) substance or (2) combination of substances or (3) proportion of substances in combination, or (4) "newness of the
dosage, or methods, or duration of administration or application, or other conditions of use
of the drug prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof" even though the
drug is not new when used differently. 3 Fed. Reg. 1847 (1938) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§
2.108(1), (2), (3), (4) (1938 Supp.)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.3(h)(1), (2), (3), (5)
(1976)). Five months later, another category of "newness" was added: "the newness of use of
such drug in diagnosing, curing, mitigating, treating, or preventing a disease, or to affect a
structure or function of the body, even though such drug is not a new drug when used in
another disease or to affect another structure or function of the body." 3 Fed. Reg. 3161 (1938)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. § 2.108(5) (1938 Supp.)) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h)(4)
(1976)). It is interesting that this section says nothing specifically about the labeling of the
drug.
A series of Supreme Court decisions in 1973 established the agency's authority to determine whether a drug is "new" and affirmed the agency's position that expert opinion used
to claim a drug is no longer "new" must be based on the same type of well-controlled studies
required to initially prove effectiveness in an NDA. See note 46 supra. The most recent FDA
approach to drawing the line between "new" and "old" drugs is based on a drug product's
compliance with the composition, manufacturing, and labeling requirements set forth in a
"monograph" on the generic product. See notes 72-73 infra.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(6) (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 314(c) (1976) (samples of labeling required under part 4 of the NDA). Labeling must also be approved as part of the certification
procedure for insulin or antibiotics. 21 C.F.R. § 429.11 (insulin); id. § 431.17(h) (new antibiotics or antibiotic-containing products) (1976). The statutory and regulatory provisions for
antibiotics are separate from those governing "new drugs." Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970)
and 21 C.F.R. §§ 310, 312, 314 (1976) with 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1970) and 21 C.F.R. §§ 430-460
(1976). However, the certification forms for antibiotics essentially parrot the NDA forms as
far as labeling and testing requirements are concerned. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 430.20(d)(8)(ii),
72,745, 72,748 (1974) (forms 5, 6, & 9).
431.50 (1976); FoOD DRUG Cos. L. REP., Federal
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tions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed
labeling."' 5' The statute defines "substantial evidence" as "evidence
consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including
clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved
,52 FDA regulations elaborate on the data that should be re....
ported in safety and efficacy studies 3 and define the "principles
* developed over a period of years and . . . recognized by the
scientific community as essentials of adequate and well-controlled
clinical investigations."' 54 The required tests are usually very costly
and can significantly delay the introduction of a new drug."
Once the tests are completed and the NDA has been submitted,
the drug company and the FDA work out the language of the labeling in negotiations. The manufacturer's position in these negotiations is often based on recommendations from several departments,
such as marketing, medical, legal, and regulatory affairs, that have
competing interests. 7 Nevertheless, the drug company is usually
assumed to favor the widest possible indications and the fewest
restrictions on the insert.' The FDA side of the negotiations may
1121

U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (1970).
5221 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970).
E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.1(c) (1976) (especially items 10 and 12 of the NDA).
54 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii) (1976). These essential principles include: a clear statement of the objectives of the study; methods of selecting and assigning subjects to test groups
that will insure suitability, minimize bias, and protect comparability by eliminating extraneous variables; an explanation of the methods of observing and recording results; provision
of a "control" (e.g., no treatment, placebo, active treatment, or historical) that can be quantitatively compared with the test results; and a summary of the methods of analysis and
evaluation of the data, including any appropriate statistical methods. Id.
Approval of a new drug involves several distinct stages or "phases," including preclinical studies in animals, clinical studies in normal humans to test safety, controlled clinical
studies to determine effectiveness, and long-term clinical "trials." See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE, NEW DRUGS: PENDING LEGISLATION 8-10 (1976); Goldberg & Azarnoff, New Drug
Investigations in Man: Continuing Unresolved Problems in REGULATING NEW DRUGS 61 (R.
Landau ed. 1973).
Telephone interview with Ms. Karen Church, Regulatory Affairs Dep't, Abbott Laboratories, in Chicago (Jan. 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Church Interview]; telephone interview with Mr. Jerry Head, Regulatory Affairs Dep't, G.D. Searle & Co., in Chicago (Jan. 20,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Head Interview]. The trend toward "class labeling" and "drug
monographs" has reduced the significance of negotiations between the FDA and individual
manufacturers, and industry spokespeople claimed that more often than not the FDA, rather
than the manufacturer, writes the inserts. Telephone interview with Ms. Diane French,
Medical Dep't, Abbott Laboratories, in Chicago (Jan. 1976) [hereinafter cited as French
Interview]; Head Interview supra; see text and notes at notes 72-73 infra.
17 French Interview, supra note 56; Head Interview, supra note 56.
m This assumption is based on the manufacturer's incentive to expand sales. Interviews
with industry personnel indicate that this assumption is too simplistic. The insert is viewed
as the "manufacturer's number one defense" in court when a doctor has used a drug for a
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involve a number of persons, including medical officers and outside
experts in the relevant field." The agency normally takes a cautious
approach, shaped by the structure of its regulations and a sensitivity to congressional investigations." If the company disagrees with
the agency's conclusions, it has a right to a hearing before an administrative law judge and can appeal the result to a court of appeals."
After an NDA is approved, data-gathering and reporting requirements come into play. 2 The manufacturer and the FDA must
nonindicated use or has given a dosage outside the recommended range. Church Interview,
supra note 56. Fear of liability leads manufacturers to add warnings based on studies of
dubious scientific quality, and a loss in a products liability suit may result in a contraindication. Head Interview, supra note 56; cf. Archer, A Guide Into Chaos: Resist It, 227 J.A.M.A.
1397, 1398 (1974) (claims that "unsubstantiated, unexplained, and frivolous 'warnings' are
notorious in drug labeling" and gives examples). On the other hand, a manufacturer may
resist adding a warning or adverse reaction for fear of encouraging suits. See Letter from Dr.
John T. Flynn, Dep't of Med., Beckman Downtown Hosp., New York, to the Editor, 79
ANNAL IsmAL MED. 609 (1973). A company representative claimed that manufacturers no
longer rely on inserts to promote drugs, depending instead on advertising and detail men.
Head Interview, supra note 56. Nevertheless, manufacturers are unlikely to ignore the potential impact of insert statements on sales. See generally Examination of the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 1973-74, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Examination
Hearings].
" Each NDA is reviewed by a Medical Officer. Applications for "significant" new drugs
are usually considered by advisory committees composed of experts. See note 45 supra.
0 The FDA has several structural incentives to be negative about drug approvals and to
hedge approvals by requiring qualifications in labeling. Mistakes made in approving drugs
are much more obvious than mistakes in denying approval or omitting a warning. Alexander

Schmidt, while Commissioner of Food and Drugs, commented:
[W]hen it comes to pure unadulterated and directly applied "pressure" on the FDA,
the industry can't hold a candle to Congress, and that pressure is very one-sided and
biased.
The message to FDA staff could not be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new
drug is resolved by its approval, the Agency and the individuals involved likely will be
investigated. Whenever such a drug is disapproved, no inquiry will be made. The Congressional pressure for our negative action on new drug applications is, therefore, intense.
It seems to be increasing, as everyone is becoming a self-acclaimed expert on carcinogenesis and drug testing.
Schmidt, The FDA Today: Critics, Congress and Consumerism, 29 FooD, DRUG & CosM. L.J.
575, 581 (1974); see Crout, In Praise of the Lowly Package Insert, 29 FooD, DRUG & CosM.
L.J. 139, 141 (1974); Interview with William Vodra, Asst. Gen. Counsel, FDA, in Washington
(Dec. 30, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Vodra Interview].
The FDA has not been held liable for approval of drugs or labeling. See Merrill, supra
note 3, at 68-87.
" 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.200-.206, 314.220-.222, 314.230-.232, 314.235 (1976).
,2 For "new drugs": 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1970); 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.300-.304 (1976). For
antibiotics: 21 U.S.C. § 357(g) (1970); 21 C.F.R. §§ 431.60-.62 (1976). An important source
of data on adverse reactions is the clinical experience of the doctors who prescribe the drug.
However, doctors are not required by the statute to submit such data. See text and notes at
notes 124-26 infra.
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assemble both positive and negative information on the drug, but
the emphasis in the regulations, as in the statute,6 3 is on collecting
negative information 4 that will "facilitate a determination whether
there may be grounds . . to suspend or withdraw approval of the
application."65 The FDA will withdraw approval if new information
indicates that the drug is not safe and effective for use under the
conditions mentioned in the insert. 6 Changes in the insert require
Supplementary NDAs, a process that resembles the initial approval
of a new drug but does not require the duplication of tests already
performed.67 The regulations provide that changes adding negative
information (e.g., warnings or contraindications) or deleting indications "should be placed into effect at the earliest possible time." 8
Drug manufacturers experience little difficulty in adding such negative information quickly. 9 Positive changes (e.g., adding indications
or deleting warnings) are much more difficult and expensive to
make, and the company will not voluntarily initiate such modifications unless the change promises to pay for itself in increased profits.7o

§§ 355(j), 357(g) (1970).
" See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 310.301 (1976).
'3 21 U.S.C.

0 21 C.F.R. § 310.300(a) (1976). There is similar language in regulations on antibiotics.
21 C.F.R. § 431.60(a) (1976).
- 21 C.F.R. § 314.115(b)(1) (1976).
6721 C.F.R. § 314.8 (1976).
" Id. at § 314.8(d),
e). The manbfacturer may put such changes into effect before
receiving final approval of its supplementary application, provided it informs the FDA. Id.
11French Interview, supra note 56; Head Interview, supra note 56. The one significant
exception to the FDA's willingness to add warnings and negative information is that such
information may not be given if it is associated with drug uses that the agency has not
approved. The FDA feels that including such advice would impliedly suggest the unapproved
use. Vodra Interview, supra note 60. This practice qualifies the value of any insert information
where an unapproved use is involved.
7 Church Interview, supra note 56; French Interview, supra note 56; Head Interview,
supra note 56. Several considerations might affect this decision. The group of potential users
may be too small to justify the expense of adding the new indication. The disease may affect
only a small number of persons, or a special patient population, such as pregnant women or

children, that requires special tests before an indication applicable to them can be added.
The manufacturer might sometimes be able to raise the price of the drug to reflect the cost
of adding the new indication, but in the usual case the drug will be marketed for other uses
and the new use will not require a special dosage form, so the manufacturer will not be able
to raise the price without adversely affecting the drug's market position for other, more
general, uses. See Kitch, The Patent System and the New Drug Application:An Evaluation
of the Incentives for PrivateInvestment in New Drug Research and Marketing in REGULATING
NEw DRUGS 81, 105 (ed. R. Landau 1973).
In addition, doctors may be prescribing the drug for the new use even without the
blessing of the insert. In such a situation, adding an indication might increase a manufacturer's potential tort liability for adverse reactions resulting from the unapproved use. Proposed regulations would allow the FDA to require manufacturers who know a drug is being
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The present regulations, as implemented in the procedures for
creating and changing inserts, provide significant information on
the level and quality of support for the various statements on a
particular insert71 that a court can look to in considering the reliability of such statements as evidence. But present regulations and
procedures do not provide an adequate foundation for generalizations on the reliability of the categories of insert information. Two
recent developments within the FDA may provide such a foundation. First, FDA personnel plan to adopt a "drug monograph"
scheme for prescription drug labeling. 2 The monograph for each
generic drug will contain the recommended insert for that drug.
Companies wishing to market the drug with an insert differing from
that in the monograph will have to submit an NDA (or Abbreviated
NDA 7 ) for approval. This scheme will encourage uniform inserts for
each drug and will replace multiple individual bargaining sessions
with one rulemaking proceeding. Second, the FDA has proposed a
regulation7 4 defining the content and required support for all categories of information presented on package inserts. The proposal seeks
to make inserts more adequate guides for practitioners
by providing standards with regard to the kind of information
that must be included under each of the specific section headings, by eliminating extraneous information which can best be
obtained from published literature, by providing explicit information on indications of use, and by replacing generalities with
7
specifics. .
used for an unapproved use to investigate and add appropriate information to the insert. 37
Fed. Reg. 16,504, § 130.-.(b) (1972); 40 Fed. Reg. 15,397, § 1.112(c)(5) (1972). Some courts
have imposed liability on manufacturers in spite of the company's appeal to its insert as a
defense. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr.
45 (1973). Imposing such liability removes the manufacturer's choice as to the purpose for
which he wishes to sell the drug.
11The manufacturer may even submit an "annotated package circular," summarizing
the support for each statement on the proposed insert, as part of the NDA. 21 C.F.R. §
314.1(d) (1976) (item 9).
12McEniry, Drug Monographs, 29 FooD, DRUG & CosM. L.J. 166 (1974); Schmidt,
Communication as the Basis of Regulation, 29 FOOD, DRuG & COSM. L.J. 9 (1974). The
"monograph" approach developed out of necessity in the regulation of over-the-counter
(OTC) drugs. Monographs outlining composition, labeling, and manufacturing standards for
each "class" of OTC dhugs became the basis of the agency's OTC review. See 37 Fed. Reg.
85, 9464 (1972). A monograph approach for prescription drugs that are no longer "new" was
proposed in 33 Fed. Reg. 7762 (1968), and this proposal included recommended labeling for
one such drug (Metyrapone).
" 21 C.F.R. § 314.1(f (1976).
7, 40 Fed. Reg. 15,392 (1975).
11Id. The proposed regulations define and fill out the categories of required insert information most relevant to this comment as follows:
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Indications and Usage: Specific uses of the drug are to be spelled out and distinguished
as (a) the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of a recognized disease or condition or of (b) a
manifestation of such disease or condition, or (c) the relief of symptoms associated with a
disease or syndrome. Uses effective only in conjunction with other modes of therapy are to
be labeled as such, and all indications must be supported by "substantial evidence based on
well controlled investigations" as defined in 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii) (1976). Further
information should indicate (a) the limits of usefulness (e.g., to particular subgroups for
whom evidence is available), any tests necessary for screening patients for susceptibility, the
"approximate kind, degree, and duration of improvement to be anticipated" (when available
on the basis of "well controlled investigations"); (b) reservations to certain situations based
on safety considerations; (c) prerequisites for long term use and differences between such use
and short-term use; and (d) that there is a lack of evidence for any use which is common, or
commonly believed to be effective, but which the "preponderance of evidence" indicates is
ineffective. Finally, any statements of comparative efficacy or safety must also be supported
by "substantial evidence" based on well controlled investigations (unless this requirement is
waived). Id. at 15,396-97.
Contraindications:"[Tlhose situations in which the drug should not be used because
the risk of use clearly outweighs any possible benefit" (e.g., administration to a patient with
a known hypersensitivity to the drug or to a member of a group having a substantial risk of
being harmed). "Known hazards and not theoretical possibilities shall be listed .
Id.
at 15,397.
Warnings: "[S]erious adverse reactions and potential safety hazards, limitations in use
imposed by them, and steps which should be taken if they occur." Warnings are to be
included on the basis of "reasonable evidence of an association" between the effect and the
drug, regardless of whether "a causal relationship" has been "proved." Warnings related to
serious risks or hazards associated with an unapproved use may be required if such use is
common. Special box warnings may be required for "special problems" leading to death or
serious bodily injury; such warnings must ordinarily be based on clinical (rather than animal)
data and should indicate the frequency and approximate mortality and morbidity rates for
patients sustaining the reaction. Id. at 15,397.
Precautions: This is the "catchall" section of the proposed categories and contains a
number of subcategories of information in addition to a "General" section. These subsections
include: information to be given to the patient for safe and effective use of the drug (e.g.,
cautions not to drive while taking the drug); tests essential to follow the patient's response
or to detect adverse reactions; identification of clinically significant interactions which might
occur with other drugs or classes of drugs in clinical use; the existence and results of studies
on long term effects related to cancer, birth defects, and impairment of fertility; and information regarding use in pregnancy (six categories of information, ranging from statements that
studies have established no risks under recommended dosages to contraindications for pregnant women where "the benefit-risk considerations are such that use of the drugs will never
be necessary in pregnant women, i.e., when safer drugs or other forms of therapy are available.") Id. at 15,397-98.
Adverse Reactions: "[A]n undesirable effect reasonably associated with the use of the
drug, which may occur as part of the pharmacological action of the drug or may be unpredictable in its occurrence." This category includes reactions occurring with drugs "of the same
chemical or pharmacological class, if applicable." The severity, mechanism, and clinical
management of important adverse reactions are to be described, and reactions are to be listed
by organ system, toxicological mechanism, severity, or frequency "as appropriate." Frequency of reactions is to be expressed either in rough estimates or, if supported by data from
well controlled investigations, in percentage figures. All potentially fatal reactions are to be
listed in the "warnings" or "contraindications" categories. Any comparative claims must be
supported by "well controlled investigations." Id. at 15,398.
Overdosage: "[T]he signs, symptoms and laboratory findings of overdosage and the
general principles of treatment" (antidotes and therapeutic measures). Id.
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Congress has recently considered legislation that would continue the trends twoard specificity, sophistication, and government control in the production of inserts. 76 Proposed bills would
grant the FDA more control over drug testing, 77 prescribe stricter
standards for approval of new drugs, 78 create an additional testing
phase in which the drug would be approved for use only by registered physicians who would be required to submit certain reports
to the agency, 79 require package inserts for patients using prescription drugs," allow labeling of drugs by class,8" establish a national compendium of drugs,82 and create a National Drug Review
Board to advise the FDA and structure aspects of the drug approval
process.8 3 The adoption of such proposals would enhance the uniformity and controls that courts could examine when assessing the
reliability of insert information as evidence.8
B.

The Role of Inserts in Medical Practice.

Although Congress's consideration of the drug legislation of
1938 and 1962 did not focus on the medical profession and at times
produced disclaimers of any intent to regulate medical practice, 5
Dosage and Administration:Recommendations for the "usual dose, usual dosage range,
and, where appropriate, an upper limit beyond which the drug should not be prescribed;
dosages shall be stated for each indication when appropriate." The insert must state the
"intervals recommended between dosage . . . the usual duration of treatment, and any
modification of dosage needed in special patient populations," and must include "directions
on dilution, preparation, and administration." Id. at 15,398-99.
The date of issuance or latest revision of the insert is to be prominently displayed.
"Clinical Studies" and "References" are not to be included unless by waiver or unless cited
for more detailed studies of an important subject that is of limited interest. No such reference
may refer to unapproved uses. Id. at 15,399.
1,See, e.g., H.R. 1603, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 630, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
S. 629, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2697, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1282, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); ExaminationHearings,supra note 58.
n S. 2697, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1975) (requiring prior approval by the FDA of test
protocols); H.R. 1603, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1977) (requiring clinical investigators to
submit reports directly to the FDA); S. 630, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (requiring the FDA
to perform the tests-at the manufacturer's expense).
11 S. 630, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977) (drugs not to be approved unless shown to
possess "significantly greater safety and effectiveness" than drugs currently on the market).
' H.R. 1603, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-12 (1977).
Id. at 3-7.
S. 629, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977).
'Id.

S. 2697, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 204-211 (1975).
' Recent highly publicized challenges to the premise that the government should control

drugs may lead to legislative reform that would have an opposite effect. See note 38 supra.
" In response to letters from the medical community expressing concern that the bill
which became the 1938 Act would interfere with the "prerogatives of the doctor," the bill's
sponsor asserted that "this bill makes certain that the medical practitioner shall not be
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the regulation of prescription drugs has inevitably affected the practice of medicine. At the very least, the FDA controls whether a drug
will be available for doctors to prescribe. The trends toward increased sophistication and expanded government control have aggravated the tension inherent in regulating medicines while purporting not to regulate medicine. If the ultimate interest is promoting the public health and safety, it is difficult to stop at providing
"the essential information the practitioner needs to use the drug
safely and effectively.""5 Once the information is there, what happens if the practitioner fails to use it?
Physicians currently view inserts with a mixture of skepticism
and reliance. The American Medical Association, while recognizing
inserts as one useful source of information,8 7 has repeatedly alleged
that inserts are an inadequate standard for medical practice, pointing to the inconsistent purposes served by the documentadvertising for the manufacturer, regulation by the government,
and information for the doctor-and to the poor quality of past
inserts.88 However, surveys of the prescribing practices of physicians indicate that package inserts (as reprinted in the Physician's
Desk Reference)"5 are now the most frequently consulted source of
information on drugs,90 and suggest that physicians not only consult
inserts, but rely on them for making decisions on dosage and administration." Medical respect for insert information varies with the
interfered with in his practice." C. DUNN, supra note 35, at 90 (statement of Senator Copeland); 78 CONG. REc. 2728 (1934) (remarks of Senator Copeland). The problem of regulating
medical practice did receive some attention in the .Congress considering the 1962 amendments. See, e.g., 108 CONG. REc. 17,395-405 (discussion of Senator Javits's proposed amendment to ensure that notice be given to those receiving "experimental" drugs).
U 40 Fed. Reg. 15,392 (1975).
" Interview with Dr. John C. Ballin, Director, Dep't of Drugs, A.M.A., in Chicago (Dec.
16, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ballin Interview]; Archer, Instrument or Impediment? 220
J.A.M.A. 1474, 1475 (1972).
" See, e.g., Examination Hearings, supra note 58, pt. 1, at 309, 322 (testimony of Dr.
James H. Sammons, Chairman, Bd. of Trustees, A.M.A.); Archer, A GuideInto Chaos:Resist
It, 227 J.A.M.A. 1397 (1974); Archer, Instrument or Impediment? 220 J.A.M.A. 1474 (1972);
Drug Regulationand the AMA Departmentof Drugs, 224 J.A.M.A. 1185 (1973); Ballin Interview, supra note 87.
" See note 2 supra.
" Survey of Drug Information Needs and Problems Associated with Communications
Directed to Practicing Physicians (May 8, 1974), reprinted in Examination Hearings, supra
note 58, pt. 5, at 1548. The study found that the PDR was the most often consulted source of
drug information, being used by about 97% of all doctors. Id. at 1597. Inserts were ranked
slightly lower. Id. at 1602. National journals, textbooks, and meetings and courses were
considered more reliable, however. Id. at 1622. See also Allan, Communication of Drug
Information to the Physician,29 FOOD, DRUG & CosM. L.J. 146 (1974).
"I See Miller, PrescribingHabits of Physicians:A Review of Studies on Prescribingof
Drugs (pts. 7, 8), 8 DRUG INTELLIGENc E & CLINCAL PHARMACOLOGY 81 (1974), reprinted in
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category of information involved, however. Doctors are aware of the
negative bias and delay of FDA procedures, and are skeptical about
the absence of indications and the mention of adverse reactions and
even warnings.92 The growing influence of inserts may reflect the
convenience of insert information and the fear of possible tort liability as much as confidence in the reliability of inserts.
The future role of inserts in medical practice will depend on the
actions of the FDA and Congress. The FDA's attitude toward the
role of inserts in medical practice reflects the tension inherent in the
congressional attempt to regulate drugs without regulating medical
practice. 3 In prefatory comments to the proposed regulations statExamination Hearings,supra note 58, at 1386. Miller distinguishes among various "stages"
in the decision to prescribe a drug, and finds that the PDR is most important at the "trial"
stage, when the M.D. has already become acquainted with the drug through other sources
and is checking for dosages, indications, and so on. Id. at 87, 1392.
12 See, e.g., Haynes v. Baton Rouge General Hosp., 298 So. 2d 149, 153 (La. Ct. App.
1974) (record of testimony by expert witness disparaging the FDA and restrictions printed
on "flyers").
," The agency's position on the use of drugs for unapproved indications is an illustration.
Several articles have pointed out examples of widespread "unapproved" uses, and others have
criticized the inserts for failing to include all indications generally recognized by the medical
profession. Archer, A Guide Into Chaos: Resist It, 227 J.A.M.A. 1397 (1974); Peck, FDA
Approval: When Should Your Judgment Outweigh It? CuRRET PRSCIBING, Dec. 1975, at
26; 229 J.A.M.A. 1744 (1975). In 1970 the Director of the Bureau of Drugs, Henry Simmons,
suggested that doctors prescribing approved drugs for unapproved uses should submit reports
to the agency so that the doctor could be given any available information on the unapproved
use and so that his own experience would not be "lost." 213 J.A.M.A. 1902 (1970). The A.M.A.
reacted critically to Simmons's suggestion, questioning the agency's authority to collect such
data directly from doctors and the utility of such collection. 213 J.A.M.A. 1902-04 (1970). The
A.M.A. argued that the "investigational or experimental status of a therapeutic agent or
procedure" should be determined by medical practise, not government regulations or commercial considerations. Id. at 1904. See also Archer, Instrument orImpediment? The Regulatory Monograph in Medical Communications, 220 J.A.M.A. 1474, 1476-77 (1972).
In 1972 the FDA proposed regulations that forbid the interstate shipment of drugs
"intended for uses not contained in the currently approved labeling" and require that a
"manufacturer, physician, or other person who ships or requests shipment. . . in interstate
commerce with the intent, or for the purpose, of an unapproved use must first file with the
Food and Drug Administration an investigational new drug plan." 37 Fed. Reg. 16,504, §
130-(a)(2) (1972). Because of limits on the FDA's jurisdiction, see 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503
(1972), the regulations announce that once a drug intended for an approved use has been
shipped, the statute does not require a doctor to file an investigational new drug plan "in
order to lawfully prescribe the drug for an unapproved use, when such prescribing is done as
part of the practice of medicine." 37 Fed. Reg. 16,504, § 130.-(a)(3) (1972). If the unapproved use either threatens to become a public health hazard or promises a benefit, however,
the regulations oblige the FDA to take one of several courses of action, including requiring
the manufacturer to obtain data and conduct clinical studies to determine the safety and
effectiveness of the unapproved use, changing the insert to add a warning, contraindication,
indication, or restriction on prescription practices, requiring package inserts for patients, or
even withdrawing approval from the drug. 37 Fed. Reg. 16,504-05, §§ 130._ (b)(1)-(8)
(1972).
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ing the agency's position on the legal status of package inserts94 and
specifying the content of and support for categories of insert information, 5 the FDA admits the limitations of the inserts and the
"ultimate responsibility" of the prescribing physician, taking the
position that inserts do not "control" medical standards and that
the physician's tort liability should depend "upon all of the facts
surrounding that use, and not upon whether or not the indication
is in the package insert." 6 Nevertheless, the FDA points out that it
has been given power to control the availability of drugs from which
prescribers may choose" and warns that doctors departing from
inserts have "the responsibility to be well informed about the drug
and to base such use on a firm scientific rationale or on sound
medical evidence, and to maintain adequate medical records of the
drug's use and effects.""
Congress is now considering legislation that would end at least
part of the ambiguity over the FDA's power to regulate medical
practice. Congressional committees have investigated whether doctors do or should be required to follow inserts, 9 and some proposals
would make it illegal for doctors to prescribe certain drugs for uses
not mentioned on the insert without FDA approval. '
C.

Judicial Assessments Of Reliability

Courts considering inserts as evidence must evaluate a document prepared under a system that is still in flux. The negative bias
built into the regulatory structure, more pronounced as government
control has increased, makes inserts suspect as indications of good
medical practice. On the other hand, the growing sophistication of
inserts has increased their influence over medical practice and has
encouraged the FDA and Congress to consider the inserts as a check
against abuses by drug prescribers as well as drug manufacturers.
The courts can simplify their task by evaluating the standard
categories of information on the insert separately. Proposed regula37 Fed. Reg. 16,503-04 (1972).
, 40 Fed. Reg. 15,392-95 (1975).
" 40 Fed. Reg. 15,394 (1975).
37 Fed. Reg. 16,504 (1972). The proposed regulations indicate that the FDA may
consider the prescription of drugs for nonapproved uses in deciding whether to find the drug
unsafe and withdraw it from the market entirely.
"1 40 Fed. Reg. 15,394 (1975). While most doctors would agree with at least the first of
these requirements, many would consider the second unnecessary and wasteful if the use is
well recognized by the profession. See 213 J.A.M.A. 1902-04 (1970).
" See ExaminationHearings, supra note 58.
' S. 2697, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, 39 (1975).
"
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tions that reflect current FDA practice make it possible to generalize about the information under each category."' 1 Courts can distinguish among the ten categories on the basis of the content and
intended function of each category, the motivation of the manufacturer and the FDA to include or exclude data in each category, the
support required for statements under each category, and the impact of each category on medical practice. Such generalizations and
distinctions allow a court to avoid time-consuming examinations of
the quality of insert evidence by developing rules based on the 1stan2
dard characteristics of the different categories of information. 1

Ill.

THE INSERT AS HEARSAY

The argument most frequently invoked against insert evidence
in the reported cases is that it should be inadmissible as hearsay."'5
The hearsay rule'"4 prohibits the use of an insert to prove the truth
of the statements it contains. Some courts have circumvented the
rule by admitting inserts to prove the existence rather than the
truth of their contents." 5 Koury v. Follo10 6 demonstrates the pressures on courts to admit insert evidence in spite of its acknowledged
hearsay character.
I" See note 75 supra.
'2 The division of inserts by category is not completely satisfactory. The proposed regulations indicate that some categories of information, particularly indications and precautions,
may contain several types of statements requiring different levels of support. Nevertheless,
the regulations will allow a court to differentiate among types of information in each category
as well as among categories. See note 75 supra.
'" See, e.g., Allen v. Leonard, 270 Cal. App. 2d 209, 218-19, 75 Cal. Rptr. 840, 847 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1969); Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 375-76 158 S.E.2d 548, 556 (1968).
"I0See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1361
(rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1974) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE (rev. ed. Chadbourn)].
"' This pattern was suggested by dicta in Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285
(1940), one of the earliest reported malpractice cases involving the use of a manufacturer's
pamphlet against a prescribing doctor. Since the defendant doctor asserted that he had
followed the procedure recommended on the pamphlet, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that he had not been prejudiced by the trial court's decision to allow the pamphlet in evidence. The court noted that "the [trial] court out of an abundance of caution
gave the jury instruction. ., that they could consider the pamphlet only for the sole purpose
of showing 'that Dr. Reed had knowledge of the information contained in the circular (pamphlet)."' Id. at 297, 8 S.E.2d at 290.
Courts have also evaded the consequences of the hearsay rule by allowing inserts to
provide the basis of expert testimony. See Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 33839, 181 N.W.2d 882, 886-87 (1970). But see Hundemer v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc.,
22 Ohio App. 2d 119, 122-23, 258 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ct. App. 1969) (deposition by army nurse
in another state based solely on insert held inadequate as expert testimony on proper administration of drugs). See generally FED. R. EVID. 703; MCCORMicK, supra note 104, § 15. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1962).
1- 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
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In Koury the parents of an infant who had become totally deaf
after being treated with the drug Strep-Combiotic (a compound of
streptomycin and penicillin G procaine) for asthmatic bronchitis
alleged that the doctor had administered an excessive amount of the
drug and had failed to inform them of the hazards involved. Evidence from a medical text indicated that the dosage was excessive,
and experts testified that it was sufficient to cause deafness in the
child. The drug's package insert stated: "Strep-Combiotic is contraindicated for pediatric use because there is a danger that dosages
calculated to provide adequate amounts of Penicillin will, in some
instances, supply excessive amounts of Streptomycin to infants and
children.' '1 7 The defendant claimed to be unaware of the manufacturer's warning and introduced evidence that the drug was regularly
stocked on the pediatrics ward of the hospital where the infant was
treated and that the dosage prescribed was standard for pediatricians in the community. The state supreme court reversed the trial
court's judgment of nonsuit, finding sufficient evidence to create a
jury issue on the question of negligence. In response to the defendant's objections to the admission of the manufacturer's literature,
the court agreed that the insert, like a medical text, was hearsay.,0 8
Nevertheless, the court held that when inserts were used not to
prove the truth of their contents, but to prove that the doctor knew
or should have known certain information, the hearsay rule did not
apply. Although the insert could not prove that the drug was unsafe
for pediatric use, it was evidence that the doctor had been warned
of the alleged danger. The doctor's disregard of this warning was
"relevant upon the issue of his use of reasonable care, where other
evidence shows the drug is, in fact, dangerous to the child."I"
This approach does not adequately respond to the policies behind the hearsay rule. It is difficult to prevent the jury from using
the insert as proof of its contents, particularly if independent medical testimony is not required. For example, in Sanzari v.
Id. at 371, 158 S.E.2d at 553.
Id. at 376, 158 S.E.2d at 556.
'" Id. at 376, 158 S.E.2d at 556-57 (emphasis added). The limitations on the use of
inserts were made explicit in the later case of Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 203 S.E.2d
330, aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974).
In this suit by the parents of a child who had died of aplastic anemia after being given
Chloromycetin for a viral infection, the drug inserts were the only evidence that the doctor
had breached his standard of care. Despite the widely known misuse of Chloromycetin and
the accompanying relaxation of the rules of evidence and liability in at least two states, see
text and notes at notes 17-18 infra, the court held that it was not error to exclude the inserts
from evidence. Under Koury insert warnings are relevant to showing that a doctor acted
unreasonably only if there is independent evidence that the warnings are based on fact.
"
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Rosenfeld1 0 a New Jersey court using an analysis similar to that in
Koury held that a doctor could be found negligent on the basis of
insert information even without independent evidence that the information was true. Relying on the common knowledge exception to
the expert testimony requirement, the court declared that "it is
within the common knowledge of laymen that a reasonable man
• . .who knows a drug is potentially harmful to a certain type of
patient should take adequate precaution .
*..."I"
Although the
court purported to admit the insert for a purpose other than proving
the standard of care, the result implicitly treats the insert information as evidence of the truth of its statement that the drug was
"potentially harmful" to the patient.
The courts in Sanzari and Koury managed to reach what they
considered equitable results by manipulating the technicalities of
the hearsay rule. While this technique might be useful or necessary
in some jurisdictions, a more straightforward approach is to analyze
insert evidence in light of the policies underlying the hearsay rule.
Such an analysis not only indicates whether insert information
should be admissible, but also suggests what weight should be given
admitted insert evidence.
Courts are hostile to hearsay evidence because the testimonial
risks of sincerity, memory, perception, and narration 12 are significant when the person who made the statement is not present, under
oath, and subject to cross-examination at the trial.' 3 The sincerity
risk, traditionally the strongest basis for excluding hearsay, exists
when the person making a statement lacks sufficient motive to be
truthful or has a motive to be untruthful, or when the circumstances
11034 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961).
' Id. at 143, 167 A.2d at 633. The common knowledge exception normally applies where
the need for medical judgment is minimal and lay persons are competent to resolve the
negligence issue without expert assistance. See generally 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
MEDICAL MALPRArCE 8.05 (1960 & Supps.). Most cases involving the use of insert evidence
do not fit comfortably within the rationale of the common knowledge exception. Inserts are
prepared for experts, address technical questions, and are written in language that may
require expert interpretation.
"I Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv.
741, 744-45, 760-67 (1961); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 177, 185-88 (1948). McCormick and the Advisory Committee for
the Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge only three categories of risk, finding sincerity to
be "only an aspect" of the other three. McCoRMCK, supra note 104, § 245, at 581; Advisory
Comm. Notes on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 117, 288 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Advisory Comm. Notes]. This comment treats sincerity risks as analytically separate. See
Maguire, supra, at 745 & n.12.
M'See McCoRMICK, supra note 104, at § 245.
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1
provide inadequate checks on truthfulness."
Oath, presence, and
cross-examination at trial are the usual protections against sincerity
risks. The perception and memory risks reflect the possibility that
a witness will not accurately perceive or recall the facts he reports.'
Cross-examination can reveal the abilities of the witness to perceive
and remember and the circumstances that might affect those abilities in a particular case. Narration risks include the dangers that
testimony will be misrepresented or that improper inferences will be
drawn."' Misrepresentation is not a problem when the speaker is in
*court and improper inferences are less likely when crossexamination is available. Hearsay evidence will normally be excluded unless special circumstances significantly reduce these testimonial risks or create a "necessity" for the testimony." 7

A.

The Insert and the Testimonial Risks

An analysis of the testimonial risks associated with using inserts to prove the truth of the statements they contain is complicated by two factors. First, since inserts are prepared through a
process of investigation, interpretation, reporting, and evaluation,
an insert statement involves multiple hearsay with testimonial risks
present at each stage of the process. Second, since the levels of
required support and the motivations of the interested parties differ
among the categories of information on the insert, the categories
involve different testimonial risks. A useful approach is to consider
the risks associated with three stages in preparing and presenting
insert evidence: the gathering of data, the negotiations that lead to
the contents of a particular insert, and the evaluation of the insert
by the jury.
The process of collecting data involves all four testimonial
risks, but the severity of the risks varies with the source of the data.
These sources range from controlled studies to reports from clinical
practice, depending on the category of information involved. Indications are the only category that must be supported by "wellcontrolled" studies. The minimum level of support necessary to
publish limitations on the use of a drug, such as contraindications,
warnings, precautions, or adverse reactions, ranges from
,, See Maguire, supra note 112, at 744, 765-67; Morgan, supra note 112, at 185-88.
See Maguire, supra note 112, at 744, 763-65; Morgan, supra note 112, at 188.
See Maguire, supra note 112, at 744-45, 760-63; Morgan, supra note 112, at 185-88.
I,? Wigmore analyzes exceptions to the hearsay rule in terms of circumstantial probability of trustworthiness and necessity. 5 WIGMORE (rev. ed. Chadbourn), supra note 104, at §§
1420-1423.
"

"'

19771

Package Inserts as Evidence

' 8
"theoretical possibilities" to "known hazards. ""
The characteristics of controlled studies reduce all four testimonial risks significantly. The statutory mandate that controlled studies be "conducted by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the drug"" 9
lowers the sincerity risk. Many drug companies have the tests conducted by academic experts who are motivated to maintain their
professional reputations. The designs of studies conducted by inhouse experts are subject to criticism by other experts in the FDA
and should leave little room for subjective tampering with the results. 2' Regulations on well-controlled studies lower perception
risks by excluding extraneous variables, requiring a control group,
and making explicit the statistical methods used to evaluate results. 2' Immediate recording of significant data minimizes reliance
on memory. Finally, regulations requiring full explanations of the
test design and the methods for evaluating data'22 combat narration
risks by eliminating sources of ambiguity in interpreting the results.
Reports by practitioners lack many of these protections against
the testimonial risks. Although drug companies are required to relay
any adverse reaction reports they receive to the FDA,'2 3 doctors are
not required by federal law to report either negative or positive
experiences with the drugs they prescribe.'24 Inconvenience and the
fear of malpractice suits'25 create incentives for doctors not to report
adverse reactions. These incentives suggest that the existence of
adverse reaction reports is reliable on sincerity grounds while the
absence of such reports may be suspect. Because of the lack of
announced standards for evaluating or classifying reports from prac-

See note 75 supra.
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970).
The FDA's capacity adequately to supervise the tests performed by manufacturers has
been periodically questioned. Cf. Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1975, at 5, col. 5 (FDA Commissioner
commenting on the need for better controls on studies done by manufacturers). See generally
Preclinicaland Clinical Testing by the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 1975, Joint HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Proposed legislation would increase the FDA's control over testing.
See text and notes at notes 76-83 supra.
121 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii) (1976).
"a
"'

12

Id.

See note 62 supra.
Id. Doctors involved in the testing of an "investigational new drug" (IND) are required
by the drug's sponsor to report their observations, but are not required to report to the FDA.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a)(12), (13) (1976).
'" Cf. Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 975, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 390 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1971) (doctor's report to FDA concerning adverse reaction introduced as evidence
against him).
"

121
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titioners, the risks of faulty perception are higher than with controlled studies. Nevertheless, doctors are trained observers, and if
the drug company or the FDA receives a number of individual reports on a particular reaction, the possibility of individual errors in
perception is significantly reduced. Reports from clinical experience
are also likely to involve time lapses that create memory risks. The
narration risks inherent in such reports might be reduced by the use
of standardized reporting forms that encourage a doctor to include
background data, such as case histories or patient characteristics,
that could qualify his observations. As such forms become more
comprehensive, however, the likelihood that doctors will take the
12
time to fill them out decreases.
At the negotiation stage of insert preparation the primary testimonial risk is sincerity. The drug company has conflicting motives:
to sell the drug, to avoid tort liability for failure to warn, and to give
basic information to physicians."2 The FDA has the announced purpose of presenting accurate information, but the general negative
bias of the regulatory structure and frequent pressure from onesided congressional investigations give the agency incentives to
avoid approving indications or omitting negative information.1 2 In
spite of the motives on each side that impeach sincerity, the whole
negotiation process may be more sincere than the sum of its parts.
The marketing incentives of the drug company and the cautionary
posture of the FDA may lead through an adversary process to a
reliable insert.1 21 In addition, the statutory and regulatory requirements for insert information reduce the discretion of the parties and
12 An attempt by the A.M.A. to collect reports of adverse reactions was discontinued for
lack of responses in 1968. See ExaminationHearings,supra note 58, pt. 1, at 320 (testimony
of Dr. Sammons). In October, 1972, the FDA issued special self-addressed reporting forms
and emphasized that reports would be kept confidential. In fifteen days the agency received
more adverse reaction reports (1200) than in the previous six years. McEniry & Willig, The
FederalFood, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Medical Practitioner,29 FooD, DRUG & COSM.
L.J. 548, 557-58 (1974).
'
See text and notes at notes 57-58, 70 supra.
"
See text and note at note 60 supra.
"
The new drug evaluation process has been criticized in congressional hearings for
relying too heavily on tests run by manufacturers who are interested in the result, and the
FDA has been attacked for succumbing to industry pressures to approve drugs and indications that fail to meet statutory standards. See, e.g., ExaminationHearings,supra note 58,
pt. 7, at 2823-3139. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs responded to the allegations of proindustry bias in a 900 page report in October, 1975 analyzing the testimony against the agency
in detail and concluding that the FDA suffered from nothing more serious than the problems
of organization and communication that beset any large bureaucracy. Comm'r of Food &
Drug Admin., Commissioner's Report (Oct. 1975). The anti-industry bias created by the onesided slant of the frequent congressional investigations may be a more serious problem,
particularly in light of the limitations on the manufacturer's incentives. See note 70 supra.

19771

Package Inserts as Evidence

thus the area where motives can influence outcomes.131 Sincerity
risks vary with the category of insert information involved since
different categories require different levels of support and offer dif3
ferent incentives to the parties.1 1
When the insert, which was designed to guide doctors, is presented as evidence to laymen on juries, narration risks are likely to
be the most formidable. Critics of inserts as evidence claim that a
medical background is necessary to comprehend insert terminology
and to recognize the limitations of the information presented. 3 2 Unlike experts on the stand, inserts cannot aid the jury by answering
hypothetical questions concerning their application to a particular
34
case.'1 Cases support the need for expert interpretation of inserts,'
but this need can be filled by the parties and by witnesses, including
130The specificity of the proposed regulations, see note 75 supra, and the shift from an
adjudicatory to a notice and hearing approach that will lead to class labeling, see text and
notes at notes 72-74 supra, will make the requirements more objective.
131 Indications, which must be supported by "substantial evidence," are considered important by the manufacturer and the FDA. Contraindications are also viewed quite seriously,
and the proposed regulations require fairly strong objective evidence for this category. Warnings require less support, although boxed warnings should be distinguished from others.
Adverse reactions require a low level of objective support, and doctors do not attach much
importance to this section of the insert. Drug manufacturers therefore have less incentive to
take this category seriously. Head Interview, supra note 56; see note 75 supra.
132Davis Interview, supra note 56.
13 Many jurisdictions require experts to answer hypothetical questions describing the
factual bases of their opinions when the experts give their opinions on fact situations that
they have not personally observed. See McCoRMICK, supra note 104, § 14. Yet only one court
has mentioned that inserts are improper opinion evidence. Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 376,
158 S.E.2d 548, 556 (1968). Hypothetical questions in theory assure that an opinion is based
on an application of an expert's knowledge to the facts of the particular case. The theory is
often unworkable in practice, however, and the more progressive jurisdictions rely on crossexamination to reveal the bases for an expert's views. McCoRMICK, supra note 104, § 16. A
similar procedure should be used with inserts. The basis for an insert's recommendation can
be found in the FDA regulations or in the FDA's files on a particular drug. The FDA, in
response to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975), has recently
expanded access to information in its files. Some restrictions, designed to protect trade secrets
and privacy, still remain. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.5, 314.14, 431.70-.71 (1976).
'" See, e.g., Haynes v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 298 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1974)
(insert said drug was ineffective against "most" strains of Enterobacter); Brune v. Belinkoff,
354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) (testimony that inserts are not meant as guides for
specialists); Lhotka v. Larson, 238 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1976) (injections, but not oral administration of drug, contraindicated); Fisher v. Wilkinson, 382 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1964) (insert
warned against "dermatitis" but not "exfoliative dermatitis," a much more serious condition
which had never been associated with the drug before plaintiff's case); Crouch v. Most, 78
N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967) (package instructions in snake-bite kit directed at the layman
and not intended to bind physicians); Holland v. Stacy, 496 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Okla. 1972)
(doctor testified that particular precautions applied only to patients with high blood pressure).
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experts from the FDA'3 and doctors presented by either the plaintiff
or defendant.
B.

Necessity: Comparative Testimonial Risks

A court deciding whether to admit insert information should
consider not only the magnitude of the testimonial risks associated
with the insert, but also the alternative evidence available. Some
types of hearsay evidence are the best or the only evidence literally
or practically available in a particular situation. If no adequate
alternative can be obtained, a court may admit hearsay evidence
under some exception based in part on the principle of "neces1 36
sity."
Two lines of argument support the "necessity" for admitting
insert information. First, assuming arguendo that live expert testimony would be the better evidence, such testimony is very expensive and the "conspiracy of silence" makes medical experts undependable and often unavailable to the plaintiff.137 Inserts are therefore necessary as a "second-best" resource. Alternatively, one can
argue that the inserts are in fact superior to live expert testimony
as a source of evidence and that the difficulty and expense of getting
even the "second-best" live expert makes the inserts all the more
important.' 3 The sources of insert information and the motives of
those who prepare inserts may present fewer risks than the limited
expertise and bias of a practicing doctor as a witness.
C.

Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

The exceptions to the hearsay rule correspond more or less to
situations in which circumstances lowering the testimonial risks or
'1 FDA personnel are not infrequently subpoenaed to testify in suits involving inserts.
Vodra Interview, supra note 60.
Mu5 WIGMORE (rev. ed. Chadbourn), supra note 104, § 1421, at 253; 6 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1691 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE (3d ed.)]. The paradigm case
of necessity is the "unavailability" of the speaker, which is a requirement for certain of the
traditional hearsay exceptions. MCCORMICK, supra note 104, § 253. See also FED. R. EVID. 804.
Wigmore mentions expense as an aspect of necessity in his discussion of the learned treatise
exception. 6 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra, § 1691, at 5. Economic unavailability is not as logically
appealing as physical (death) or legal (privilege, immunity from process) unavailability, but,
especially when coupled with the "conspiracy of silence," it produces the same effects.
,"7 This argument is made in Comment, Admissibility of Medical Books in Evidence, 8
U.S.F.L. REv. 364, 381-82 (1973) [hereinafter cited as San Francisco Comment]. See
generally note 5 supra. The courts that have admitted inserts have often referred to plaintiff's
difficulties in securing expert testimony. See note 25 supra.
118Wigmore suggests this line of reasoning in discussing medical texts, arguing that
doctors usually base their testimony on these sources anyway and that the text writers are
better qualified, have greater incentives for accuracy, and lack the bias of a witness paid by
one of the parties in a trial. 6 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 136, § 1692, at 6.
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creating a necessity for hearsay evidence are present.139 The most
frequently recognized exception under which inserts are arguably
admissible accepts learned treatises as evidence of the truth of their
contents.4 0 This exception is based primarily on circumstantial
guarantees that treatises are trustworthy, since an author generally
has a strong motive to report the'truth and no interest in the particular case, and opposing counsel can attack and expose out-of-date
statements."' In addition, such evidence may be the best available,' and treatise evidence is highly probative compared to that
43
given by most experts, who often base their opinions on treatises.
Inserts share with treatises several characteristics that underlie
the treatise exception. Although inserts are prepared in part by drug
manufacturers, who, unlike text writers, may have suspect motives
as potential parties in litigation,' the influence of any bias is
checked by the countervailing motives of the manufacturer, the
participation of the FDA, and the regulatory requirements for objective support.' Trial counsel can challenge out-of-date inserts, and
the FDA has increased efforts to ensure that inserts are kept cur"' The necessity for inserts is the same as that for treatises, and
rent. 46
inserts have a high evidentiary value as compared to testimony by
medical experts.'4 7
Treatment as learned treatises would not mean universal admissibility for inserts, however. Medical treatises are admissible as
direct evidence in only two jurisdictions by case law4 ' and a few
others by statute.' In most other jurisdictions, treatises are admis,3' Most exceptions were created without being explained in terms of rational principles,
and even in the modem codes, the exceptions do not match the rationales exactly. See
McCoRMICK, supra note 104, §§ 244-245, at 579-84; 5 WIGMORE (rev. ed. Chadboum), supra
note 104, § 1420, at 252.
"I See FED. R. Evin. 803(18); McCORMCK, supra note 104, § 321; 6 WIGMORE (3d ed.),
supra note 136, §§ 1690-1700; Holz, Learned Treatises As Evidence in Wisconsin, 51 MARQ.
L. REv. 271 (1967); 66 MICH. L. Rav. 183 (1967); San Francisco Comment, supra note 137.
' 6 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 136, §§ 1690, 1692, at 2-4. 6.
,2 Id. § 1691, at 5.
"1 Id.; see Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558, 567 (1857).
'" Cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (interest in litigation as creating suspect
motive).
" See text and notes at notes 119-31 supra.
' See 40 Fed. Reg. 15,392, 15,396, 15,399 (1975) (proposed §§ 1.106(b)(5), 1.112(d)).
, Inserts are created by the party with the most comprehensive information about the
drug and are consulted more often than any source by prescribing doctors. See text and notes
at notes 90-91 supra.
Is See City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Lewendowski v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 74-77, 146 N.W.2d 505, 508-09 (1966). See San
Francisco Comment, supra note 137, at 372-73; Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1962).
"I MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 79C (1974). Nevada had a similar statute until 1971,
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sible to a greater or lesser degree during cross-examination.' 0 Even
where admissible, treatises are usually restricted to supporting or
impeaching expert testimony and are not considered as independent
substantive evidence.'51 These limitations are justified in part by
narration risks;'5 2 because of the fear that the jury will be misled
unless the treatise is interpreted by an expert, admissibility is limited to situations where an expert is on the stand and available to
testify.'5 3 In addition, before any treatise can be admitted, it must
be proved to be a "standard authority" in the field.'54 This requirement helps guarantee reliability and guards against judging a doctor
by a standard not available to him.
Some of these limitations are unnecessary for inserts. Inserts
are readily available to all doctors and are consulted more often for
guidance in prescription decisions than any "standard" text. Although the narration risks associated with inserts are more difficult
to distinguish from those accompanying treatises, most courts that
have admitted inserts have not imposed the limitations that attach
to treatises.'5 5 The insert statements have either seemed sufficiently
clear or the available experts have provided adequate interpretations.
Another hearsay exception that might apply to inserts is that
when the legislature replaced it with one based on rule 803(18) of the then Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence (allowing admissibility "To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination"). NEv. REv.
STAT. § 51.255 (1973); see Note, Overcoming the Conspiracyof Silence, supra note 6, at 102440; 84 A.L.R.2d 1338, 1347-50 (1962).
'o See San Francisco Comment, supra note 137, at 367-72; Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (1958).
"5 See McCoRMICK, supra note 104, § 321, at 743-44.
152 See FED. R. EVID. 803(18); Adv. Comm. Notes, supra note 112, at 316. For other
justifications of the limitations, see Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1338, 1344-46 (1962).
' See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(18); Adv. Comm. Notes, supra note 112, at 316-17. This
concern is also reflected in rules allowing texts to be read aloud but not to be carried into
the jury room as physical exhibits. Id.
'5 FED. R. EVID. 803(18) adopts a liberal approach in allowing a text to be "established
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice." Overly strict requirements for establishing that a work is a
"recognized authority" can destroy the utility of texts as weapons against the "conspiracy of
silence." For an example of the difficulty of eliciting the required testimony from a hostile
witness, see Conason, Medical Cross-Examination-Refusalto Recognize Medical
Authorities, 10 TRIAL LAw Q., Spring, 1974, at 29.
' The general trend of the case law is described in Merrill, supra note 3, at 52-65;
Pruzan, supra note 7, at 729-32. Most courts do not explicitly articulate their reasons for
distinguishing between the admissibility of inserts and the admissibility of medical texts. An
exception is the court in Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W. 39, 42-43 (S.D. 1974), which mentioned
the rapid development in the field of drugs, the rigorous testing required by the government,
the potential liability of drug manufacturers, and the limits on doctor time and expertise to
justify admitting an insert.
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for public records and reports.' 5 Evidence admitted under this exception is not subject to the limitations governing treatise evidence,
but extending the public reports exception to cover inserts is more
problematic. The common law and statutory exception for public
records is based on "the assumption that a public official will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember
details independently of the record,"' 5 an assumption complicated
by the many public and private participants in insert preparation.
Inserts might come within a recent expansion of the exception in
rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to include "evaluative
reports."' 58 The admission of such reports is the most controversial
aspect of the public records exception," 9 however, and the scope of
the exception is still uncertain. Inserts seem to fit within the terms
of rule 803(8) as "factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law," but even if inserts
qualify as evaluative reports, the Advisory Committee Notes recommend that such evidence be excluded if "the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."'6 0 The controls built into the data gathering process and the adversary nature
of the negotiations to prepare the inserts may provide sufficient
indicia of reliability to withstand exclusion under this provision.
Even if inserts do not fit within any recognized exceptions, a
court may admit them by creating a new exception on the basis of
the policies behind the hearsay rule. The Federal Rules of Evidence
codify this possibility and suggest the relevant considerations in a
special provision for admitting hearsay evidence
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing [recognized]
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
'='See FED. R. Evm. 803(8); McCoRMICK, supra note 104, §§ 315-17; 5 WIGMORE (rev. ed.
Chadbourn), supra note 104, §§ 1630-1684; McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of
Reports of Official Investigations? 42 IowA L. REv. 363 (1957).
,s,
FED. R. Evw. 803(8), Adv. Comm. Notes, supra note 112, at 311.
,' MCCORMCK, supra note 104, § 317, at 737-38.
"
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7088; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7064-65.
10 FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(c). The Advisory Committee Note suggests the following factors
as indicative of trustworthiness: "(1) the timeliness of the investigation . . .; (2) the special
skill or experience of the official . . .; (3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which
conducted. . .; (4) possible motivation problems. . . " Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note
112, at 313. These factors suggest an analysis in terms of the testimonial risks of sincerity,
memory, perception, and narration.
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more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.'61
This rule articulates the two basic criteria applied to inserts above:
the presence of testimonial risks-"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and serving "the general purposes of
these rules"-and necessity-high probative value compared to rea62
sonably available alternative sources of evidence.
The analysis of insert evidence in terms of these criteria indicates that admitting inserts would be consistent with the policies
underlying the hearsay rule. The probative value and availability of
inserts are high compared to the practical alternative sources of
evidence, and the trier of fact will be aided in its determinations if
all relevant and material insert information is admitted. The regulated insert preparation process substantially reduces the testimonial risks, and the insert can be challenged by an investigation into
its foundations or the presentation of contradictory evidence."13 The
insert categories based on inference or reports from clinical experience, rather than controlled studies, carry higher testimonial risks,
but more probative evidence on these points is difficult to obtain.
Rather than excluding any category of insert information as hearsay, a court should take account of the differences in the probative
value and testimonial risks associated with the various categories
when determining what role each category should play as evidence
of the standard of care or causation.

IV.

THE INSERT AS EVIDENCE OF THE STANDARD OF CARE

Overcoming the hearsay objection does not by itself guarantee
that an insert statement will be admitted as evidence of the stan,,1
FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(5) (same language).
lZ The concern for the "interests of justice" appears to allow a court discretion to consider policy issues apart from the hearsay rule.
"1 The quality of an opposing party's challenge to insert evidence will depend on the
admissibility and availability of such sources as FDA records, manufacturers' records, medical texts, articles, and doctors' records. Some sources, such as the testimony of live experts,
hospital records, and medical treatises, may be independently admissible as direct evidence.
See McCoRNUcK, supra note 104, § 313; text and notes at notes 140-54 supra. Others, such as
journal articles, are normally excluded. See, e.g., Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36
(1971). The FDA maintains some restraints on access to its files. See note 133 supra. While
allowing extensive investigation into the data supporting insert statements would lower the
hearsay risks, such an exercise could expand the possibilities for delay and confuse the jury.
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dard of care. The relevance and admissibility of insert information
depend on how a court defines the standard of care and on whether
insert evidence can be accommodated with the policies and conceptual framework that underlie that definition.
A.

The Traditional Rules: Policies and Problems

Courts have traditionally held that the standard of care in medical malpractice trials is established by the customary practice of
doctors as proved by expert testimony." 4 The most important justification advanced for this approach is that the standards accepted
as good medical practice by a significant portion of the profession
are likely to be sounder than standards set by judges or juries." 5
Judicial tribunals allegedly lack the experience and competence to
assess the wisdom of technical decisions involving a high degree of
judgment and to distinguish between negligent and nonnegligent
errors of judgment. 6' Legislatures also generally defer to the medical profession rather than using statutes or administrative agencies
to define good medical practice in particular situations.1 7 This deference reflects the concern that legislative or administrative stan'" See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 6; Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv.
1147, 1163-67 (1942); Note, Malpracticeand Medical Testimony, supra note 6; Annot., 81
A.L.R.2d 597 (1962). Definitions of the relevant class of doctors vary, and courts recognize
practices accepted by respectable minorities in the profession and allow for extraordinary
circumstances. See 1 LouisEu. & WILLAms, supra note 111,
8.04-.06. Currently recognized
exceptions to the professional standard rule are discussed in note 175 infra.
",5 It has also been urged that the doctor-patient relationship is essentially a consensual
one and that the community standard of care reflects the reasonable expectations and desires
of the parties more accurately than any substitute standard established by such intervention
could. See Epstein, supra note 6.
I"See McCoid, supra note 164, at 605-09; Morris, supra note 6, at 1163-67. The most
notorious recent case of judicial standard setting is Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519
P.2d 981 (1974), where the court determined that the defendant opthalmologist was negligent
as a matter of law for failing to give the plaintiff a pressure test for glaucoma although the
trial court had found that the uniform practice of the profession was not to give such tests to
persons of the plaintiff's age and condition. The state legislature responded by passing WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975), which purported to reestablish the professional standard.
See Bradford, A Unique Decision, J. LEG. MED., Sept./Oct. 1974, at 35; Epstein, supra note
6, at 108-113; 20 N.Y.L.F. 669 (1975); 51 WASH. L. REv. 167 (1975).
" See e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 (1975). Regulation of medical practice has thus far been
left to the states by the federal government, though present national health insurance programs for certain groups have resulted in some modifications of this generalization, primarily
to deal with inefficient or fraudulent use of government funds. See Comment, PSRO: Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1974);
Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical Practice:A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organization,42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 822 (1974); Note, PSRO: A
Status Report on Medical Peer Review Under the 1972 Social Security Act Amendments, 6
Loy. CHI. L. REv. 90 (1975). But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970) (disclaiming intent to regulate
medical practice in program providing health insurance for the aged).
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dards would prove inflexible or unworkable and would not necessarily improve the quality of medical care.168
Reliance on the standard practice of the profession as proved
by experts may also promote administrative efficiency. Rather than
determining a scientifically correct standard and permissible deviations, the trier of fact decides only whether the defendant's conduct
met a standard defined by expert witnesses, whose testimony the
procedures of the court are designed to evaluate. Even when conflicting testimony produces a "battle of the experts," the evidence
is limited to the issue of defining the professional standard; the
courts avoid becoming forums for determining scientific truth-a
function they are ill-suited to perform.
The professional standard rule and the expert testimony requirement also operate as devices for controlling juries in a context
where a sympathy-provoking plaintiff, whose suffering may result
from his illness rather than the doctor's negligence and who benefits
from hindsight, faces a presumably insured doctor who had to make
a judgment under uncertain conditions and whose reputation and
livelihood are at stake.169 Limiting the standard of care issue to
questions a jury can comprehend and appropriately decide reduces
the potential for confusion that might encourage the trier of fact to
decide on the basis of immaterial considerations. Requiring expert
testimony provides an even more direct check on the jury's discretion.
The traditional rules have their critics. Plaintiffs complain
about the difficulty and expense of acquiring expert testimony. The
stated justifications for the professional standard of care rule are
open to question, particularly when a doctor's decision involves prescription drugs. Commentators 70 and witnesses in congressional
hearings 7 ' have challenged the soundness of customary prescribing
practices . 7 The more extreme allegations that the misuse of drugs
See Epstein, supra note 6, at 107 & n.43.
leg
See Morris, supra note 164, at 1165.
II

'7' E.g., Maronde, A Study of PrescribingPatterns, 9 Med. Care 383 (1971); Sice,
Commentary: Major Drug-PrescribingPatternsin General Hospitals, 18 CLINICAL PHARM. &
THERAP. 133 (1975); Simon & Stolley, This is Medical Progress? Trends and Consequences of
Antibiotic Use in the United States, 227 J.A.M.A. 1023 (1974) (followed by several
"comments" expressing contrasting views). But see Melmon, Sheiner & Rosenberg, Medical
Benefits and Risks Associated with PrescriptionDrugs: Facts and Fancy, in DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND MARKrING 5 (R. Helms ed. 1975).
'
E.g., ExaminationHearings,supra note 58.
272 Alleged abuses include prescribing without taking a culture to determine the identity
of the disease and the effectiveness of the drug, prescribing without an examination, prescribing a drug that is contraindicated or that can do nothing for the patient's problem, and
prescribing for unnecessary prophylactic purposes. See generally H. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR
MAN 276-83 (1970).
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by medical professionals has reached crisis proportions are probably
exaggerations,7 3 but the cases involving package inserts indicate
17
that the improper use of at least some drugs has been widespread. 1
The judicial efficiency and jury control justifications for the traditional rules are also subject to attack outside the prescription drug
context. Insured defendants accused of negligence often face seriously injured plaintiffs in nonmedical tort suits involving highly
technical issues without such special rules. Moreover, the current
cost of malpractice litigation, and the confusion generated by conflicting expert testimony, suggest that the traditional rules have had
only limited success in achieving efficiency and objectivity.
B.

The Use of Inserts: Possibilities and Policies

Courts willing to allow inserts a properly circumscribed role as
evidence of the standard of care may be able to alleviate some of
the problems created by the traditional rules without seriously jeopardizing the policies underlying those rules 17 5-encouraging sound
medical practice, promoting efficiency, and checking the discretion
of the jury. The potential value of insert evidence on the standard
of care in a particular case depends on the nature of the medical
decision in question and the characteristics of the insert information
relevant to that decision.
Insert information is relevant to at least three of the four general types of decisions doctors make in prescribing drugs. Plaintiffs
have introduced insert evidence to challenge doctors' determinations of what drug, if any, should be prescribed,176 how a drug should
"'

See, e.g., Melmon, Sheiner & Rosenberg, supra note 170.

"I See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); text and notes at notes

176-79 infra. Possible reasons for such abuse include the pressures put on doctors by patients
and drug promoters; see, e.g., Muller, The Overmedicated Society: Forces in the Marketplace
for Medical Care, 176 SCIENCE 489 (1972); The PeculiarSuccess of Chloromycetin, supra note
18, the asserted inadequacy of medical education in clinical pharmacology, see TASK FORCE
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE BACKGROUND PAPERS:

THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS (1968); DOWLING, supra note 172, at 271-72, and the overwhelming
amount of information on current changes in drugs. See DOWLING, supra, at 289-90.
"I Courts have already created and expanded exceptions to the special rules in cases
where the reasons for the special rules seem inapplicable. The most common titles for these
exceptions are "res ipsa loquitur" and "common knowledge," but the techniques courts use
are more varied than these two titles suggest. See Note, Malpracticeand Medical Testimony,
supra note 6, at 343-49 (1963); Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standardof
Care, supra note 6, at 744-47 (1970); Res Ipsa Loquitur: Its Place in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 343 (1973). There is no consensus on the boundaries of these
exceptions, and decisions have been criticized for overestimating the competence of juries,
see McCoid, supra note 6, at 632; Epstein, supra note 6, at 114-15, and judges, see note 166
supra, to make sound decisions in superficially "obvious" cases.
"' This decision involves balancing the costs and benefits of using a particular drug
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be administered, 7 7 and what information should be disclosed to a
(probability and character of the desired results, the chances and severity of adverse reactions
for a particular patient) and the costs and benefits of alternative therapies (other drugs,
nondrug therapies, no treatment).
Several cases have involved the prescription of Chloromycetin for colds (against which
it is ineffective) and for minor infections in spite of special warnings that the drug should be
used only for particular conditions, e.g., typhoid fever, which are life-threatening and respond
poorly to safer treatments. See, e.g., Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1963);
Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270
N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971). Other
cases involving alleged misprescription of drugs include: Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 67 Cal.
Rptr. 471 (Dist. Ct. App.), rev'd, 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968) (use
of tranquilizer contraindicated for severely depressed patients); Haynes v. Baton Rouge Gen.
Hosp., 298 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (drug used to combat strain of bacteria against
which insert said it was ineffective); Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961)
(drug which constricted blood vessels used on patient with high blood pressure); Marchese
v. Monaco, 52 N.J. Super. 474, 145 A.2d 809 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958), petitionfor certification denied, 28 N.J. 565, 147 A.2d 609 (1959) (patient alleged his condition not serious enough
to warrant using drug that could cause deafness); Koury v. Folio, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d
548 (1968) (drug stamped "not for pediatric use" administered to nine-month-old girl); Marsh
v. Arnold, 446 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (drug which could cause dizziness and loss
of equilibrium used when doctor allegedly knew other drugs would work); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973) (patient with positive tuberculosis test given
drug allegedly unsafe for such patients). See also Short v. Downs, 537 P.2d 754 (Colo. App.
1975) (drug labeled "not for human use" used for breast augmentation); Ruden v. Hansen,
206 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1973) (pregnant hogs given vaccine when insert contraindicated vaccination during pregnancy).
Administering a drug requires decisions on proper dosage and routes of administration
(e.g., oral, intravenous injection, intramuscular injection) and on what precautions (e.g.,
sensitivity tests, questions about allergies) should be observed.
Improper dosage was alleged in the following cases involving inserts: Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) ("overdose" of
sodium urokon in translumbar aortography); Carter v. Metropolitan Dade County, 253 So.
2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) ("overdose" of Mellaril given to suicidal fourteen-year-old);
Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) ("overdose" of spinal anesthetic
during vaginal delivery); Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968) ("overdose" of
antiobiotic given to child who became deaf); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App.
218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964) ("overdose" of sodium urokon in translumbar aortography).
The following cases involved allegations of negligent administration of the drug Sparine
(promazine hydrochloride): Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d 411, 303
N.E.2d 392 (1973); Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971); Schrib v. Seidenberg,
80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1969). Other cases in which negligent administration
was alleged include: Horace v. Weyrauch, 159 Cal. App. 2d 833, 324 P.2d 666 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958) (subcutaneous injection when insert recommended only intravenous injections); Julien
v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272 P.2d 718 (1954) (negligent administration of sodium pentathol,
no details given except that use was contrary to the insert); Campbell v. Preston, 379 S.W.2d
557 (Mo. 1964) (failure to advise use of qualified anesthesiologist); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M.
406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967) ("antivenin" injected in location contrary to that indicated on instruction sheet); Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 39 (S.D. 1974) (negligent administration of
cortisone); Versteeg v. Mowery, 72 Wash. 2d 754, 435 P.2d 540 (1967) (failure to follow
instructions for implanting prosthesis in breast).
Cases where a failure to take proper precautions was alleged include: Chrestman v.
Kendall, 247 Ark. 802, 448 S.W.2d 22 (1969) (patient became permanently deaf when doctor
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patient.178 On the other hand, inserts are at best tangentially
rele1 79
vant to a doctor's diagnosis of a patient's illness.
This comment's examination of the insert preparation process
and of the hearsay risks associated with insert evidence has demonstrated that the various categories of insert information are not
equally relevant or probative as evidence of the proper standard of
care. Categories differ not only in reliability, but also in the type of
failed to take periodic kidney function tests while prescribing maintenance drug); Magee v.
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (doctor failed
to take recommended precautions against infection); Horace v. Weyrauch, 159 Cal. App. 2d
833, 324 P.2d 666 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (conflicting testimony on whether history and tests
were taken; testimony on uselessness of tests even when given); Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co.,
288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970) (doctor failed to make tests that might have disclosed
fatal reaction in time to correct it); Fisher v. Wilkinson, 382 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1964) (doctor
failed to detect allergic reaction); Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961)
(doctor allegedly failed to take medical history, but insert did not mention taking such a
history); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1940) (doctor failed to stop treatment
when patient's vision began to deteriorate).
" See Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967) (alleged negligent prescription of chloromycetin). The court held that "it would be negligent if defendant prescribed,
as a remedy for illnesses for which it was neither necessary nor suited, a drug which he knew
or should have known was dangerous, without advising and warning Brenda's parents of the
possible or probable injurious effects from the use thereof." Id. at 605, 155 S.E.2d at 113. On
remand, the only evidence that Chloromycetin was "neither necessary nor suited" for the use
in question was contained in the manufacturer's literature. The trial court directed a verdict
for the defendant. Since, according to Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968),
see text and notes 106-09 supra, such literature could not be admitted to prove the truth of
its contents, the court of appeals held plaintiff's evidence insufficient on the issue of negligent
disclosure. Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 203 S.E.2d 330 (Ct. App.), afl'd by an equally
divided court, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974).
For other cases on informed consent to treatment with prescription drugs, see Marsh v.
Arnold, 446 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 592604, 207 N.W.2d 297, 309-15 (1973) (court considered the most recent cases on informed
consent and held that plaintiff must establish known risks by expert testimony). See
generallynote 6 supra.
"I Insert information describing the symptoms of the condition for which a drug is
indicated may be relevant to the correctness of a doctor's diagnosis, but diagnosis decisions
usually involve a high degree of medical judgment, and inserts are likely to be less valuable
for diagnosis decisions than for treatment decisions. Distinguishing between diagnosis and
treatment may be difficult, however. Doctors sometimes use drugs that are effective against
a broad range of infections without isolating the one causing a patient's problem. This practice has been criticized by some as irresponsible, 227 J.A.M.A. 1030, 1031 (1974), and defended by others as efficient, 227 J.A.M.A. 1029 (1974). In addition, if doctors know that their
judgment in diagnosis will be treated with more deference than their judgment in treatment,
they may adjust their diagnosis decisions to give them maximum leeway in treatment. This
phenomenon has already appeared in at least one case involving the use of penicillin for
mumps. The defendant doctor testified that penicillin was not therapeutic for mumps. Defendant's record showed he had administered the drug "for mumps," but a "?" and "& pharangitis" had been added by a different pen. Rotan v. Greenbaum, 273 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
It has also been reported that doctors who believe a drug is useful for treating symptoms not
listed on the insert cover themselves by listing on their patients' charts symptoms for which
the drug is indicated on the insert. Peck, supra note 93, at 26.
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advice they give practitioners. 180 Some insert information provides
data on costs or benefits that a doctor can balance with other data
when making his decision. For example, warnings and adverse reactions describe the nature-though not usually the probability-of
the potential costs of using a drug; and indications list the uses of a
drug supported by substantial evidence of effectiveness, but usually
do not mention its effectiveness as compared to alternative treatments. Other insert information suggests possible actions without
implying that these suggestions exhaust the reasonable alternatives.
For example, instructions on dosage often indicate the amount of a
drug normally necessary to produce the desired effect; adverse reactions and warnings suggest information that might be disclosed to
patients; and indications list some, but arguably not all, legitimate
uses of a drug. Finally, some insert information makes recommendations that purport to establish the boundaries of reasonable medical practice. For example, a drug is contraindicated where the FDA
determines that the potential costs of using it outweigh any possible
benefits; and some precautions and warnings recommend that a
doctor acquire certain data or run sensitivity tests on a patient
before administering the drug.
The type of advice given reflects the limitations of inserts as
guides for medical decisions. Boundary-setting recommendations
are generally limited to decisions that can be made on the basis of
the objective data available to the FDA without the need for a
treating doctor's judgment. For example, a case-by-case balancing
of patient characteristics and circumstances is unnecessary to determine that Chloromycetin (the drug involved in Mulder) should not
be given for a cold. For decisions that require more doctor judgment
because the factors involved are more complex, less objectively
quantifiable, or more evenly balanced, inserts provide information
and may make suggestions, but the decision rests more completely
within the doctor's discretion.
Courts desiring to allow inserts a significant role as evidence of
the standard of care can protect the policies behind the professional
standards rule, the expert testimony requirement, and the hearsay
rule by limiting the categories of insert information to the evidentiary uses for which they are reliable and appropriate. The insert
statements most appealing as independent evidence of the proper
standard of care are those from reliable categories that make clear
and apparently definitive recommendations on decisions that re'" See note 75 supra.
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quire minimal judgment on the part of the treating doctor. The
strongest statements in terms of these criteria are contraindications-clear recommendations against use based on weighing known
risks against any possible benefit. Warnings that limit the use of
drugs, precautions that require certain tests or procedures, and limitations on safe dosage levels also fit the criteria, but such recommendations are more questionable because the level of support they
require is not specified. Indications are supported by the most reliable data, but must be read in light of the limiting information on
an insert (a task an expert should perform) and do not usually take
account of the alternative treatments that are relevant to a prescription decision. The absence of an indication is not a clear recommendation and does not reflect reliable support. Instructions on normal
dosage and administration make clear recommendations, but their
reliability may be questionable, and the potential for case-by-case
variance is high. Adverse reactions, warnings that list serious hazards, and precautions that give information on carcinogenicity do
not make recommendations, but rather provide information on the
costs of a given decision. One-sided information on benefits and
costs may appropriately serve as the basis for an expert's balancing,
but is not designed to be weighed by lay people without expert
assistance.
C.

The Use of Inserts: Alternative Approaches

The potential value of an insert statement in terms of encouraging sound medical practice, promoting judicial efficiency, and
checking the discretion of jurors does not by itself determine the
relevance of insert evidence to the negligence issue. A threshhold
question is how the law defines the standard of care. Several courts
have admitted inserts as evidence on the negligence issue, but few
have expressly considered how to integrate this new evidence with
the prevailing definition of the standard of care. The significance of
insert evidence will depend on whether the standard of care continues to be defined by professional practice, is identified with the
insert itself, or is determined by a jury or a judge choosing on some
basis between these two alternatives. Three alternative ways in
which courts might accommodate the definition of the standard of
care with insert evidence on the negligence issue are suggested by
current approaches to the standard and the case law on insert evidence.
1. Maintainingthe ProfessionalStandard Rule. In a jurisdiction that defines the standard of care by current professional prac-
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tice, inserts are relevant evidence of the standard only if it can be
proved that medical practice conforms to their recommendations.
The question is not whether inserts are reliable guides, but whether
a significant number of doctors actually follow them. The testimonial risks are not a problem, since the insert is being used to prove
only that it makes a recommendation, not that the recommendation
is reliable.
If the professional standard must be proved by expert testimony, the insert can be influential only as a basis for an expert's
opinion.' If a court relaxes this requirement to allow inserts as
independent evidence of the professional standard, an insert's significance will depend on the foundation necessary to show that an
insert statement is relevant to current medical practice. To require
that a qualified expert must testify that the professional practice in
82
the community is identical to a particular insert recommendation
would severely restrict the insert's value as a weapon against the
"conspiracy of silence." While any insert evidence admitted with
such a foundation may seem mere surplusage, it could have an
important impact on a jury if the expert testimony on the standard
of care is conflicting.
Inserts would play a more significant role if courts admitted
them on the basis of testimony by less qualified experts or statistical
evidence that doctors normally follow inserts in the absence of special expertise with a drug or unusual circumstances. This approach,
which was followed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Mulder v.
Parke Davis & Co. in its first opinion, s3 could substantially erode
the expert testimony requirement and alleviate the "conspiracy of
silence." General evidence that doctors follow inserts, however,
without reference to a particular drug or a particular category of
insert information, is not very strong proof of the professional standard for a particular decision. In addition, a jury may confuse the
issue of what doctors actually do with what the jurors feel doctors
should do.
2. The Insert as a Burden-ShiftingDevice. A second approach
would allow a plaintiff who can prove that his doctor departed from
certain insert recommendations to shift to the defendant the burden
of either proving or producing evidence of compliance with the customary practice of the profession." 4 The insert would not serve as
"I See note 105 supra.
182See, e.g., Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 536-37, 276 A.2d 36, 47 (1971).
"I Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 338, 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (1970).
18, Cf. McCoid, supra note 6, at 632 (recommending that defendant have burden of going
forward if plaintiff has introduced persuasive non-expert testimony).
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evidence of the proper standard of care, and its reliability would not
be open to attack. This approach preserves the advantages of looking to professional practice for the ultimate standard, but also attacks the "conspiracy of silence" problem by placing the burden of
producing expert testimony on the party with the best access to
experts. Requiring the plaintiff to prove a departure from an insert
recommendation diminishes the potential for frivolous suits.
The burden-shifting procedure involves several difficulties. Although the insert is not intended to serve as evidence of the standard of care, an implicit judgment that an insert represents a prima
facie standard is necessary to justify the burden-shifting function.
Unless the insert is superior evidence, it is unclear why courts
should allow this function to inserts rather than medical treatises,
journal articles, and other materials. This comment's analysis of
inserts indicates that certain categories of insert information are
superior to alternative materials, but suggests that only the more
reliable recommendations that purport to define the standard of
care should qualify to shift the burden. Proving a departure from
an insert recommendation may also raise a problem. The benefits
of the burden-shifting procedure will be compromised if a plaintiff
needs expert testimony to prove a departure. ' Most recommendations that purport to define standard medical practice are fairly
clear, however, and in any event the pool of experts qualified to
interpret inserts includes FDA officials and doctors outside the community.
A more difficult problem is to adjust the consequences of shifting the burden so that the procedure will achieve its purpose without attaching undue weight to the insert evidence. Shifting the burden of producing evidence while leaving the burden of proof on the
plaintiff will not help a plaintiff who has no expert; a doctor may
be able to get a summary judgment or a directed verdict by simply
testifying that his actions met the customary standard. Such testimony should be an adequate defense as a matter of law unless the
departure from the insert is evidence of the standard of care, rather
than a mere burden-shifting device. Shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant might allow more cases to get to the jury, on the
ground that the jury could reasonably disbelieve the testimony of
the doctor or his experts. 86' This approach makes it difficult to confine the jury's use of the insert, however; a doctor's departure from
'1 See text and notes at notes 132-35 supra.
'l A court's standard for granting a directed verdict will determine the potential impact

of shifting the burden of proof when the plaintiff has no expert testimony.

I
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an insert is likely to influence a jury's evaluation of the defendant's
evidence, regardless of the court's instructions.
A final question raised by the burden-shifting procedure is
whether the burden should shift when the plaintiff has expert testimony other than the insert to support his case. If the procedure is
designed only to assist plaintiffs who cannot get experts, it may
seem unnecessary when the plaintiff has an expert. On the other
hand, the plaintiff may still be suffering a relative disadvantage in
access to experts, and it seems anomalous to deny a plaintiff with a
presumably stronger case the advantages granted to those unable to
get experts. However, since the plaintiff's disadvantage is less severe
in such a case, shifting the burden of proof is more difficult to justify
without an implied assumption that medical practice will improve
if certain insert recommendations create a prima facie standard of
care. If doctors perceive that insert recommendations will play an
important role in allocating burdens of proof in malpractice trials,
the customary practice of the profession may tend to become indistinguishable from the relevant insert recommendations. 8 7 If this
tendency were to become pronounced, the effects of a burdenshifting approach would approach those of treating departures from
inserts as direct evidence of negligence.
3. The Insert as a PrimaFacie Standard of Care. In Mulder
v. Parke Davis & Co. 188 the court formulated a set of rules creating
an exception to the professional standard of care rule to allow a
plaintiff to prove a prima facie breach of the standard of care by
showing that his doctor deviated from certain insert recommendations. 189 The burden then shifts to the defendant to justify or excuse
I" Cf., e.g., Methylprednisolonefor Sunburn,FDA and PackageInsert Notwithstanding,
225 J.A.M.A. 72 (1973) (letter from doctor concerned about legal implications of using a drug
for a purpose not on the insert); Peck, supra note 93, at 28 (cautions physician against the
risk of departing from the insert under present law).
'1 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970); see text and notes at notes 19-25 supra.
"89 The plaintiff must presumably lay a proper foundation for the insert he seeks to use,
including a demonstration that the insert was current and available to the prescribing doctor
when the allegedly negligent act occurred. See Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95
Cal. Rptr. 381 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971); note 10 supra. The plaintiff must also prove that the
defendant deviated from a material insert recommendation, a task that may require expert
testimony. See text and notes at notes 132-35 supra.In addition, the Mulder opinion requires
the plaintiff, as a condition of establishing the doctor's prima facie negligence, to prove by
"competent medical testimony" that the doctor's deviation caused the injury. This requirement confuses the issues of standard of care and causation and has been deleted by the courts
that have followed Mulder. See note 27 supra. Requiring expert testimony to prove causation
may undercut Mulder's liberalizing effect on the standard of care. See text and note at note
225 infra.
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his deviation.'"" This procedure's impact on the policies underlying
the professional standard rule'"' and its success in combating the
effects of the "conspiracy of silence" will depend on what types of
insert information are allowed to define the prima facie standard of
care and what defenses are allowed to justify or excuse a departure
from the standard.
The Mulder opinion mentions several types of insert recommendations as standard-setters, 92' but does not explain why they
were selected. If a court restricts the relevant recommendations to
those such as contraindications, that are in reliable categories and
make clear recommendations on decisions that do not require a
treating doctor's judgment, the impact on sound medical practice
would not be severe even if only minimal defenses were available.
If weaker recommendations, such as indications or warnings, are
allowed to set the standard, the nature of possible defenses becomes
more critical.
The Mulder opinion stops short of making any recommendation
conclusive on the negligence issue;'93 the doctor always has a chance
I" Compare Mulder with Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), in which the plaintiff alleged that excessive
amounts of a drug administered in a diagnostic proceeding had paralyzed him. The court held
that insert information on proper dosage was admissible, but rejected a trial court instruction
suggesting that a departure from the insert might by itself constitute experimentation which
would be negligent unless the patient had given his informed consent: "The mere fact of
departure from the manufacturer's recommendation where such departure is customarily
followed by physicians of standing in the locality does not make that departure an
'experiment."' Id. at 575-76, 317 P.2d at 180. See also Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 423,
272 P.2d 718, 724 (1954) (insert information provides "prima facie proof of a proper method
of use, given by the maker, which must be presumed qualified to give directions for its use
and warnings of any danger therein").
"I The Mulder procedure appears to depart dramatically from the policy of deferring to
the presumed wisdom of current medical practice. Previous exceptions to the professional
standard and expert testimony rules have been made in cases where a court has determined
that the medical judgment factor is minimal and where laypersons are competent to resolve
the negligence issue without expert assistance. See note 175 supra.In such cases the reasonable person standard replaces the professional standard. Although at least one court has held
that information from an insert was adequate to bring the medical decision in question within
the common knowledge of the jury, Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 143, 167 A.2d 625, 633
(1961), most cases involving the use of insert evidence do not fit comfortably within the
rationale of the common knowledge exception. See text and note at note 111 supra.
11 Where a drug manufacturer recommends to the medical profession (1) the conditions under which its drug should be prescribed; (2) the disorders it is designed to relieve;
(3) the precautionary measures which should be observed; and (4) warns of the dangers
which are inherent in its use, a doctor's deviation from such recommendations is prima
facie evidence of negligence . ...
288 Minn. at 339-40, 181 N.W.2d at 887.
113
This reluctance to eliminate the doctor's discretion is sound. Even contraindications
are subject to the limited foresight and possible bias of the insert preparers.
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to defend his departure from the recommendation. But the court
gives no real guidance on what defenses are available. While the
Mulder procedure in effect shifts the burden of proof on the standard of care issue to the defendant, it differs from the simple
burden-shifting approach discussed above in not expressly adhering
to the professional standard rule in evaluating a doctor's defenses.
The court does not mention any specific defenses, but declares that
a doctor must give the reasons for his deviations and that the jury
will normally determine whether the reasons justify or excuse the
doctor's action.194 The court adds that "[t]here may be situations
where as a matter of law the explanation exonerates [the doctor]
unless rebutted by other competent medical testimony."' 95 By failing to specify what might count as a defense, Mulder leaves the
medical profession, trial courts, and juries with no guide other than
the insert.
Considering several defenses that doctors might raise illustrates
the problems the Mulder court failed to address. First, the defendant might attack the quality of the insert itself as a standard by
testifying that he disregarded an insert recommendation because he
considered all inserts unreliable"' or because he had reason to believe the particular recommendation was unreliable. 9 ' A defense on
the ground that inserts are generally unreliable seems inconsistent
with the presumption of reliability implicit in allowing insert information to establish a prima facie standard of care. Yet even such
general attacks on inserts are relevant for a jury evaluating a doctor's choice between an insert recommendation and an action based
on other sources of information. The testimonial risks associated
with insert evidence should discourage too strong a presumption of
reliability, especially since the recommendations most frequently
used by plaintiffs in malpractice actions do not require support from
" 288 Minn. at 340, 181 N.W.2d at 887-88.
195 Id.

"96 See,

e.g., Haynes v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 298 So. 2d 149, 153 (La. Ct. App. 1974);

text and notes at notes 88, 92 supra. But see text and notes at notes 90-91 supra.
117See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,
317 P.2d 170 (1957) (recommended dosage allegedly inadequate to produce desired results).
This defense merges into reliance on alternative sources of information. See text and notes
at notes 201-04 infra.
A defendant might also offer evidence that he did not consider when making his decision.
The status of such evidence raises an interesting problem. Since the sources were not consulted, they should not affect an evaluation of the doctor's method of making his decision.
Yet if they are excluded, the doctor might be punished for using the drug properly. Such
information may be more relevant to the issue of causation than to the standard of care.
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well-controlled studies. 9 ' The best protection against the testimonial risks is to give the defendant an opportunity to impeach a
particular recommendation.
A second possible defense is that the doctor's actions conformed
to the standard practice of the profession. 99 If compliance with the
professional standard is a defense as a matter of law, the Mulder
approach would resemble the burden-shifting approach discussed
above."' Compliance with the professional standard does not exhaust the possible defenses. A doctor might argue that he relied on
his own experience,20 ' consultation with other doctors,02 a reference
other than the insert, 0 3 or some other source,2

4

or claim that the

special circumstances of the case justified departing from the insert.0 5 Under the professional standard rule, such defenses would
have to be proved to be consistent with the practice of at least a
respectable minority of the profession.20 ' This requirement will
rarely impose a great burden on doctors, who have ready access to
expert testimony, and courts concerned primarily with relieving
,,8
Indications are the only category requiring such studies. See note 75 supra.
" Compliance with the professional standard has been recognized as an adequate defense in several cases where courts have considered inserts as "evidence of negligence." See,
e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem.
Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964); cf. Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d
250 (1967) (controversy among medical practitioners over the proper procedure held a good
defense). At least one court sent the case to the jury in spite of uncontradicted expert testimony that the defendant's conduct conformed to the standard of practice in the community.
See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
200 The statement in Mulder that some explanations might be sufficient as a matter of
law unless rebutted by competent expert testimony suggests this interpretation. 288 Minn.
at 340, 181 N.W.2d at 887. However, the opinion states that the negligence issue will usually
go to the jury. Unless the court assumed that doctors will usually be unable to prove compliance with the professional standard (a dubious assumption given the realities of expert
testimony), it probably did not intend to make compliance a defense as a matter of law.
2" See, e.g., Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563
(1964); Marsh v. Arnold, 446 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
"2 See Marchese v. Monaco, 52 N.J. Super. 474, 145 A.2d 809 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1958), cert. denied, 28 N.J. 565, 147 A.2d 609 (1959) (rejecting defense of consultation where
defendant had conferred with experts in the relevant field, but had failed to show them the
insert or alert them to the dangers the insert revealed).
03 See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 973, 95 Cal Rptr. 381, 389 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1971).
20 See, e.g., Haynes v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 298 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1974)
(pathologist's drug sensitivity report and good patient response justified use of drug in spite
of insert's possibly contrary statement).
" See, e.g., Haven v. Randolph, 494 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (highly technical and
dangerous life-saving procedure); Carter v. Metropolitan Dade Cty., 253 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971) (high dosage of Mellaril given to suicidal patient).
2" See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. Wu.Lkms, supra note 111,
8.04, at 204 & n.70.
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what they perceive as an unfair disadvantage of plaintiffs are unlikely to relax the defendant's burden.
Another possible defense is that the doctor obtained the plaintiffs informed consent before deviating from the insert."' Courts
have recently concentrated on the lack of informed consent as a
sword, rather than the presence of informed consent as a shield."'
But a doctor's disclosure-whether required or voluntary-that his
actions will deviate from an insert recommendation might be introduced as a defense if a patient who consents to such treatment later
sues. The hard issue is not whether a patient's informed consent
should constitute a defense, but under what circumstances a patient's acquiescence can qualify as informed consent. Defining standards for informed consent, a difficult task in the cases expanding
causes of action for lack of informed consent, 29 may be especially
problematic in prescription
drug cases where patient package in210
involved.
are
serts
Finally, defendants in cases involving inserts have sometimes
claimed that they were ignorant of an insert recommendation,2 11 or
212
had been misled by representatives of the drug manufacturers.
Claiming ignorance may prove attractive in jurisdictions where
treatises cannot be admitted unless the defendant admits that he
consulted them and recognizes their authority. 23 But the reasons for
this restriction are less applicable to evidence as widely available
and as well recognized as inserts. Mere ignorance of an insert's
recommendation should not excuse a doctor from explaining his
deviation. Misinformation by a manufacturer's representative is
2M See generally id. 9.03, at 238-46.
208 Recent decisions have challenged a physician's traditional authority to determine

what a patient should be told. See note 6 supra. Courts may soon require doctors to inform
their patients when they are deviating from an insert recommendation. Cf. Sharpe v. Pugh,
270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967) (doctor has duty to inform parents of dangers of giving
Chloromycetin to child for minor infection); 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 310.102
(1977) (doctor using Investigational New Drug must get patient's informed consent). But see
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 577, 317 P. 2d 170,
180 (1957) (mere departure from manufacturer's recommendation is not "experimentation"
requiring informed consent "where such departure is customarily followed by physicians of
standing in the locality").
211 See authorities cited note 6 supra.
2,o See note 2 supra;cf. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392, 1402 (rejecting
defendant drug company's contention that patient should have been aware of information on
possible adverse effects of oral contraceptives that was on the physician's insert).
211See, e.g., Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 371, 158 S.E.2d 548, 553 (1968).
212See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 280, 282 A.2d 206, 216 (1971).
213 See Allen v. Leonard, 270 Cal. App. 2d 209, 218-19, 75 Cal. Rptr. 840, 847 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (dictum).
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more serious since many doctors rely extensively on "detail men"
to learn the latest information on prescription drugs. 214 A doctor
should be able to look to a drug company for indemnification if he
justifiably relies on the representation of the company agent. Although such misrepresentation may be difficult to prove, the innocent patient seems the least equitable candidate for bearing any
215
resulting loss.
D.

The Use of Insert Evidence by Defendants

In addition to defending their departures from inserts, doctors
may attempt to benefit from the growing recognition of insert evidence by introducing insert information in their defense. While the
major uses of insert evidence have reflected the efforts of courts
seeking to lighten the burden on plaintiffs under the traditional
rules, the possibilities for the defensive use of inserts also require
consideration.
Two reasons explain why doctors seldom complain about the
restrictive treatment of inserts under present law, even when the
insert information supports a doctor's case. First, the professional
standard rule and expert testimony requirement favor the side with
the best access to experts. Second, in many cases present law will
permit doctors to use inserts effectively in defending themselves. If
a doctor desires to bring certain insert information before the jury,
20
he can probably reveal it as part of the basis of his own testimony
or introduce it to supplement his testimony under the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule. 17
Those opposed to expanding the role of inserts as defensive
evidence can argue by analogy to customs and statutes as evidence
of the standard of care 28 that while "subconformity" with insert
recommendations tends to establish negligence, conformity does not
establish due care. This argument echoes sentiments currently expressed by doctors criticizing the inadequacies of inserts,2 1 and is
supported by cases holding that the FDA's approval of an insert
does not establish that a drug manufacturer has satisfied his common law duty to warn.2 However, the language and reasoning of
22, See generally Comment, The UbiquitousDetailman: An Inquiry Into His Functions
and Activities and the Laws Relating to Them, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 183 (1973).
215 Joining the doctor and the drug company in the same suit should eliminate the

possibility for inconsistent results.
2 See note 105 supra.
2,7 See text and notes at notes 140-54 supra.
28 See Morris, supra note 164, at 1153-61.
22 See text and notes at notes 88, 92 supra.
r See, e.g., McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 397-98, 528 P.2d 522,
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some cases admitting inserts as plaintiff's evidence might also support the defensive use of the documents,"'1 and the cautious bias of
the FDA may make inserts more reliable as defensive than as offensive evidence.
Plaintiffs might also argue that there is no necessity for doctors
to use insert evidence since physicians have access to expert testimony unhampered by the "conspiracy of silence". This argument
assumes that experts will be generally available to doctors at low
cost, discounts the expense of the resources consumed even when
experts "volunteer" their services, and ignores a possible opportunity to weaken the "conspiracy" by making doctors, who are all potential defendants, less dependent on the testimony of their colleagues and therefore perhaps more willing to testify for plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, doctors need inserts far less than plaintiffs do, and
current law gives doctors a greater opportunity to use them.
A final argument against allowing doctors to rely more heavily
on inserts as a defense is that doctors seeking to avoid liability
would make prescribing decisions by following "cook-book" directions. This danger is greatest if courts allow inserts to establish the
standard of care, an approach not justified for either plaintiffs or
defendants. Courts can alleviate the problem by limiting insert evidence to the rules justified by the characteristics of the various
categories of information. While this approach will not create significantly different possibilities for the defensive use of inserts than
those allowed under current law, the limitations are required by the
characteristics of inserts and the policies underlying the traditional
rules governing malpractice litigation.
V.

THE INSERT AS EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION

Courts have given even less adequate attention to the use of
inserts as evidence of causation than to their use as evidence of the
standard of care, in spite of the fact that the causation issue may
well determine the outcome of a case. 222 The traditional rule re533-34 (1974) (overruling Lewis v. Barker, 243 Or. 317, 324, 413 P.2d 400, 404 (1966), and
citing other authorities).
221 See, e.g., Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 423, 272 P.2d 718, 724 (1954) (the reliability
of inserts makes them "prima facie proof of a proper method of use"); cf. Nordstrom v. White
Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P.2d 619 (1969) (defensive use of
American Standards Association standards for portable ladders in product liability suit).
222 See, e.g., Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 203 S.E.2d 330 (Ct. App.) aff'd by an
equally divided court, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974). The extremes to which plaintiffs
may go to prove causation is illustrated by the case of Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d
958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971). The plaintiff in that case suffered from pulmon-
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quires a plaintiff to produce expert testimony that the doctor's negligence caused the plaintiff's injury. ' This requirement is based on
concerns similar to those supporting the requirement of expert testimony on the standard of care: the need for expert assistance on
complex scientific issues and the fear that immaterial considerations may affect a jury's decision.2 4 As courts have relaxed the requirements for proving the standard of care, the causation issue has
become more important to defendants as a means of keeping a case
from the jury. Some decisions that allow inserts a prominent role
in determining the standard of care continue to require expert testimony on the causation issue, even when an insert warns that the
alleged misuse of the drug can lead to the particular injury suffered
by a plaintiff.2 Other courts seem less rigorous in their demand for
proof of causation,22 6 but no court has specifically discussed the use
of inserts as evidence of causation.
The courts' relative reluctance to loosen the requirement for
expert testimony on causation is surprising since a major justification for requiring expert testimony on the standard of care-the
desire to protect a doctor's independent judgment-is much weaker
in the context of causation. On the other hand, insert information
may be less useful on causation issues than on the standard of care.
Controversies over causation arise when there are multiple possible
causes for a particular injury, a frequent phenomenon in medical
malpractice trials. 22 An alleged injury might be caused by a combination of factors including the patient's disease, the nonnegligent
use of a drug, the patient's hypersensitivity, an inadequate disclosure of risks by the manufacturer or doctor, or the doctor's negligence in diagnosis or in choice or administration of treatment. Insert
information indicates only whether the use of a particular drug is a
ary embolisms and thrombophlebitis allegedly caused by the drug Enovid. In order to "test"
whether the drug had caused her condition, the plaintiff stopped taking an anticoagulant and
resumed taking the Enovid. Her condition deteriorated, but her suit faced the hurdle of an
assumption of risk defense. Id. at 981-94, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 395-404.
22 See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILIAMS, supranote 111, 1 11.20, at 324-27; Annot., 13 A.L.R.
2d 11, 31-34 (1950).
22 Expert testimony may not be required if the causation question is within the expertise
of laymen. Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 11, 34-36.
225See Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 340, 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (1970);
Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 203 S.E.2d 330 (Ct. App.), afrd by an equally divided
court, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974).
2m See Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d 411, 419, 303 N.E.2d 392,
397 (1973).
2 See, e.g., id.; Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d
560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); Lhotka v. Larson, 238 N.W.2d 870, 875 & n.18 (Minn. 1976); 1 D.
LouIsE L. & H. WILLTAMS, supra note 111,
8.07, at 213-17.
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possible cause of an injury and does not weigh the various possibilities to determine the most probable cause (or even the proximate
causes) under given circumstances. In most multiple causation
cases, the problem is the amount of evidence the plaintiff must
produce to take the causation issue to the jury. In determining the
weight to be given insert information, courts should evaluate the
relevance and reliability of the particular information involved. If
the use of a given drug is the alleged negligence, information that
the drug is associated with the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff is relevant evidence of causation. If the method of administering
an admittedly proper drug is attacked, the insert information
should tie the injury to the negligent act rather than to the use of
the drug in general. For example, the injury might be listed as a
possible consequence of overdosage or as a reaction that would have
been predicted by sensitivity tests, rather than as a mere adverse
reaction.
The reliability of various categories of insert information as
evidence of causation is suggested by the proposed regulations.228
Adverse reactions must appear if "reasonably associated with the
use of the drug," even if reactions have been reported only in
connection with drugs "of the same chemical or pharmacological
class." Information on the probability of particular adverse reactions (if given) must indicate the level of support behind the
"reasonable association." Warnings are to be included "as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard
with a drug: a causal relationship need not have been proved."
"Known hazards and not theoretical possibilities" are to be listed
as contradictions. In spite of the generally low threshhold requirements for adding limiting information, many statements in these
categories have substantial support, and acquiring better evidence
229
on causation-even from experts-is usually difficult.
The impact of inserts as evidence of causation may depend
more on how a court defines the burden of proof in multiple cause
cases than on the weight assigned the insert. The general rule is that
the plaintiff must prove a reasonable probability, not just a possibility, that his injury resulted from the defendant's negligence; the
2u See note 75 supra. The usefulness of the various categories of information as evidence
of causation is hampered because the standards for including information reflect the seriousness of reactions more than their probability.
22 See, e.g., Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 115, 203 S.E.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App.), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974) (court relied on expert
testimony that the cause of aplastic anemia is uncertain in a case involving Chloromycetin).
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jury is not allowed to "speculate" among equally probable causes.2
Nevertheless, at least one case where an insert was used as the
standard of care has suggested that a jury should be given wide
discretion to choose among several possible causes. 3 ' Whatever
standard is adopted, relevant and reliable insert evidence-at least
contraindications, warnings, and adverse reactions based on clinical
studies rather than random reports-should be considered by the
judge and jury in making their respective decisions.
Defendants as well as plaintiffs might introduce insert evidence
on the causation issue. A defendant can claim that the reactions not
listed on the insert are probably not caused by the drug, or use insert
information to prove that the patient's injury could have occurred
even if the drug had been used properly. 32 Where inserts are used
as evidence of causation rather than the standard of care, a court
cannot differentiate between offensive and defensive uses by holding that the insert establishes a subminimum standard.2 3 The low
threshholds of support that are sufficient to connect a drug with an
adverse reaction and the emphasis on collecting adverse reaction
reports may make evidence more reliable on the defensive than on
the offensive side.24
CONCLUSION

In response to the difficulties created for plaintiffs in medical
malpractice trials by the traditional professional standard of care
rule and expert testimony requirement, courts have begun to admit
as evidence information from package inserts prepared by drug
manufacturers according to FDA regulations. Although insert evidence is technically hearsay if used to prove the standard of care or
causation, the guarantees of reliability built into the insert preparation process and the difficulty of acquiring more reliable evidence
justify admitting insert statements under an exception to the hearsay rule. The relevance and significance of insert evidence depend
on whether and how courts use insert evidence to modify the traditional definition of the standard of care and the burdens of proof.
See id.; Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 11, 24-31 (1950).
,3, Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d 411, 419, 303 N.E.2d 392, 397
(1973).
2'2 In Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 536-37, 276 A.2d 36, 47 (1971), the court, adhering
to a conservative rule on the admissibility of medical treatises, excluded medical articles
introduced for this purpose.
131See text and note at note 218 supra.
2" See note 75 supra. The evidence is still questionable, however. A manufacturer may
fear that adding such information would discourage sales or encourage product liability suits.
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Insert statements can be used as evidence of the standard of
care without threatening the policies protected by the traditional
rules if courts distinguish among the categories of insert information
and allow a statement as independent evidence of the standard of
care only if it comes from a category requiring reliable support and
makes a clear recommendation on a question that can be settled
without the need for an attending doctor's judgment. Most insert
information is designed to provide data necessary for doctors to
make informed judgments in particular cases and is inadequate by
itself to establish the standard of care. Insert information is also
relevant to the causation issue, but here again inserts provide data
rather than weighing alternative possibilities and suggesting an answer. Inserts cannot solve the dilemma created by the desire to
protect both the doctor's independent judgment and the patient's
right to nonnegligent treatment. But if their limitations are recognized and respected, inserts can provide informative evidence that
will help courts and juries reach results that minimize the inherent
conflict between these two goals.
James R. Bird
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CAPSULES

CHLOROMYCET IN®
(CHLORAMPHENICOL)
PA-KE-Av'sIs

WARNING
Serious and fatal blood dyscrasias (aplastic anemia, hypoplastic
anemia, thrombocytopenla, and granulocytopenla) are known to
occur after the administration of chloramphenicol. In addition, there
have been reports of aplastic anemia attributed to chloramphenicol
which later terminated in leukemia. Blood dyscraslas have occurred
after both short term and prolonged therapy with this drug. Chloramphenicol must not be used when less potentially dangerous
agents will be effective, as described in the "Indications" section.
It must not be used in the treatment of trivial Infections or where
it is not indicated, as in colds, Influenza, Infections of the throat; or
as a prophylactic agent to prevent bacterial infections.
Precautions: It is essential that adequate blood studies be made
during treatment with the drug. While blood studies may detect
early peripheral blood changes, such as leukopenia, reticulocytopenia, or granulocytopenia, before they become irreversible, such
studies cannot be relied on to detect bone marrow depression
prior to development of aplastic anemia. To facilitate appropriate
studies and observation during therapy, it is desirable that patients
be hospitalized.

DESCRIPTION
Chloramphenicol is an antibiotic that is clinically useful for, and should
be reserved for, serious infections caused by organisms susceptible to
its antimicrobial effects when less potentially hazardous therapeutic
agents are ineffective or contraindicated. Sensitivity testing is essential
to determine its indicated use, but may be performed concurrently with
therapy initiated on clinical impression that one of the indicated conditions exists (see "Indications" section).

ACTIONS AND PHARMACOLOGY
In vitro chloramphenicol exerts mainly a bacteriostatic effect on a wide
range of gram-negative and gram-positive bacteria and is active in vitro
against rickettsias, the lymphogranuloma-psittacosis group and Vibrio
cholerae. It is particularly active against Salmonella typhi and Hemophilus
influenzae. The mode of action is through interference or inhibition of
protein synthesis in intact cells and in cell-free systems.
Chloramphenicol administered orally is absorbed rapidly from the
intestinal tract. In controlled studies in adult volunteers using the
recommended dosage of 50 mg./kg./day, a dosage of 1 gm. every 6
hours for 8 doses was given. Using the microbiological assay method,
the average peak serum level was 11.2 mcg./ml. one hour after the first
dose. A cumulative effect gave a peak rise to 18.4 mcg./ml. after the fifth
dose of 1 gm. Mean serum levels ranged from 8-14 mcg./ml. over the
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48-hour period. Total urinary excretion of chloramphenicol in these
studies ranged from a low of 68% to a high of 990/ over a three-day
period. From 8 to 12% of the antibiotic excreted is in the form of free
chloramphenicol; the remainder consists of microbiologically inactive
metabolites, principally the conjugate with glucuronic acid. Since the
glucuronide is excreted rapidly, most chloramphenicol detected in the
blood is in the microbiologically active free form. Despite the small
proportion of unchanged drug excreted in the urine, the concentration
of free chloramphenicol is relatively high, amounting to several hundred
mcg./ml. in patients receiving divided doses of 50 mg./kg./day. Small
amounts of active drug are found in bile and feces. Chloramphenicol
diffuses rapidly, but its distribution is not uniform. Highest concentrations are found in liver and kidney, and lowest concentrations are found
in brain and cerebrospinal fluid. Chloramphenicol enters cerebrospinal
fluid even in the absence of meningeal inflammation, appearing in concentrations about half of those found in the blood. Measurable levels
are also detected in pleural and in ascitic fluids, saliva, milk and in the
aqueous and vitreous humors. Transport across the placental barrier
occurs with somewhat lower concentration in cord blood of newborn
infants than in maternal blood.
INDICATIONS
IN ACCORD WITH THE CONCEPTS IN THE "WARNING BOX" AND
THIS INDICATIONS SECTION, CHLORAMPHENICOL MUST BE USED
ONLY IN THOSE SERIOUS INFECTIONS FOR WHICH LESS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS DRUGS ARE INEFFECTIVE OR CONTRAINDICATED. HOWEVER, CHLORAMPHENICOL MAY BE CHOSEN TO
INITIATE ANTIBIOTIC THERAPY ON THE CLINICAL IMPRESSION
THAT ONE OF THE CONDITIONS BELOW IS BELIEVED TO BE PRESENT; IN VITRO SENSITIVITY TESTS SHOULDBE PERFORMED CONCURRENTLY SO THAT THE DRUG MAY BE DISCONTINUED AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE IF LESS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AGENTS ARE
INDICATED BY SUCH TESTS. THE DECISION TO CONTINUE USE OF
CHLORAMPHENICOL RATHER THAN ANOTHER ANTIBIOTIC WHEN
BOTH ARE SUGGESTED BY IN VITRO STUDIES TO BE EFFECTIVE
AGAINST A SPECIFIC PATHOGEN SHOULD BE BASED UPON SEVERITY OF THE INFECTION, SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE PATHOGEN TO
THE VARIOUS ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS, EFFICACY OF THE VARIOUS
DRUGS IN THE INFECTION, AND THE IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL
CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN THE "WARNING BOX" ABOVE:
1. Acute infections caused by Salmonella typhi
Chloramphenicol is a drug of choice.* It is not recommended for the
routine treatment of the typhoid "carrier state."
2. Serious infections caused by susceptible strains in accordance with the concepts expressed above:
a. Salmonella species
*In the treatment of typhoid fever some authorities recommend that chloramphenlcol be
administered at therapeutic levels for 8-10 days after the patient has become afebrile to
lessen the possibility of relapse.
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b. H. influenzae, specifically meningeal infections
c. Rickettsia
d. Lymphogranuloma-psittacosis group
e. Various gram-negative bacteria causing bacteremia, meningitis or
other serious gram-negative infections
f. Other susceptible organisms which have been demonstrated to be
resistant to all other appropriate anti-microbial agents.
3. Cystic fibrosis regimens
CONTRAINDICATIONS
Chloramphenicol is contraindicated in individuals with a history of
previous hypersensitivity and/or toxic reaction to it. It must not be used
in the treatment of trivial infections or where it is not indicated, as in
colds, influenza, infections of the throat; or as a prophylactic agent to
prevent bacterial infections.
PRECAUTIONS
1. Baseline blood studies should be followed by periodic blood studies
approximately every two days during therapy. The drug should be
discontinued upon appearance of reticulocytopenia leukopenia, thrombocytopenia, anemia, or any other blood study findings attributable to
chloramphenicol. However, it should be noted that such studies do not
exclude the possible later appearance of the irreversible type of bone
marrow depression.
2. Repeated courses of the drug should be avoided if at all possible.
Treatment should not be continued longer than required to produce a
cure with little or no risk of relapse of the disease.
3. Concurrent therapy with other drugs that may cause bone marrow
depression should be avoided.
4. Excessive blood levels may result from administration of the recommended dose to patients with impaired liver or kidney function, including
that due to immature metabolic processes in the infant. The dosage
should be adjusted accordingly or, preferably, the blood concentration
should be determined at appropriate intervals.
5. There are no studies to establish the safety of this drug in pregnancy.
6. Since chloramphenicol readily crosses the placental barrier, caution
in use of the drug is particularly important during pregnancy at term or
during labor because of potential toxic effects on the fetus (gray
syndrome).
7. Precaution should be used in therapy of premature and full-term
infants to avoid "gray syndrome" toxicity. (See "Adverse Reactions.")
Serum drug levels should be carefully followed during therapy of the
newborn infant.
8. Precaution should be used in therapy during lactation because of
the possibility of toxic effects on the nursing infant.
9. The use of this antibiotic, as with other antibiotics, may result in
an overgrowth of nonsusceptible organisms, including fungi. If infections
caused by nonsusceptible organisms appear during therapy, appropriate
measures should be taken.
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ADVERSE REACTIONS
1. Blood Dyscrasias
The most serious adverse effect of chloramphenicol is bone marrow
depression. Serious and fatal blood dyscrasias (aplastic anemia, hypoplastic anemia, thrombocytopenia, and granulocytopenia) are known
to occur after the administration of chloramphenicol. An irreversible
type of marrow depression leading to aplastic anemia with a high rate
of mortality is characterized by the appearance weeks or months after
therapy of bone marrow aplasia or hypoplasia. Peripherally, pancytopenia is most often observed, but in a small number of cases only one
or two of the three major cell types (erythrocytes, leukocytes, platelets)
may be depressed.
A reversible type of bone marrow depression, which is dose related,
may occur. This type of marrow depression is characterized by vacuolization of the erythroid cells, reduction of reticulocytes and leukopenia, and responds promptly to the withdrawal of chloramphenicol.
An exact determination of the risk of serious and fatal blood dyscrasias
is not possible because of lack of accurate information regarding 1)the
size of the population at risk, 2) the total number of drug-associated
dyscrasias, and 3)the total number of non-drug associated dyscrasias.
Ina report to the California State Assembly by the California Medical
Association and the State Department of Public Health in January 1967,
the risk of fatal aplastic anemia was estimated at 1:24,200 to 1:40,500
based on two dosage levels.
There have been reports of aplastic anemia attributed to chloramphenicol which later terminated in leukemia.
Paroxysmal nocturnal hemoglobinuria has also been reported.
2. Gastrointestinal Reactions
Nausea, vomiting, glossitis and stomatitis, diarrhea and enterocolitis
may occur in low incidence.
3. Neurotoxic Reactions
Headache, mild depression, mental confusion and delirium have been
described in patients receiving chloramphenicol. Optic and peripheral
neuritis have been reported, usually following long-term therapy. If this
occurs, the drug should be promptly withdrawn.
4. Hypersensitivity Reactions
Fever, macular and vesicular rashes, angioedema, urticaria and anaphylaxis may occur. Herxheimer reactions have occurred during
therapy for typhoid fever.
5. "Gray Syndrome"
Toxic reactions including fatalities have occurred in the premature
and newborn; the signs and symptoms associated with these reactions
have been referred to as the "gray syndrome". One case of "gray
syndrome" has been reported in an infant born to a mother having
received chloramphenicol during labor. One case has been reported in
a 3 month infant. The following summarizes the clinical and laboratory
studies that.have been made on these patients:
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(1) In most cases therapy with chloramphenicol had been instituted within
the first 48 hours of life.
(2) Symptoms first appeared after 3 to 4 days of continued treatment with
high doses of chloramphenicol.
(3) The symptoms appeared in the following order:
(a) abdominal distension with or without emesis;
(b) progressive pallid cyanosis;
(c) vasomotor collapse, frequently accompanied by irregular respiration;
(d) death within a few hours of onset of these symptoms.
(4) The progression of symptoms from onset to exitus was accelerated with
higher dose schedules.
(5) Preliminary blood serum level studies revealed unusually high concentrations of chloramphenicol (over 90 mcg./ml. after repeated doses).
(6) Termination of therapy upon early evidence of the associated symptomatology frequently reversed the process with complete recovery.
DOSAGE AND ADMINISTRATION
DOSAGE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORAL
CHLORAMPHENICOL PREPARATIONS
The majority of microorganisms susceptible to chloramphenicol will respond
to a concentration between 5 and 20 mcg./ml. The desired concentration of
active drug in blood should fall within this range over most of the treatment
period. Dosage of 50 mg./kg./day divided into 4 doses at intervals of 6 hours
will usually achieve and sustain levels of this magnitude.
Except in certain circumstances (e.g., premature and newborn infants and
individuals with impairment of hepatic or renal function) lower doses may not
achieve these concentrations. Chloramphenicol, like other potent drugs, should
be prescribed at recommended doses known to have therapeutic activity. Close
observation of the patient should be maintained and in the event of any adverse
reactions, dosage should be reduced or the drug discontinued, if other factors
in the clinical situation permit.

Adults
Adults should receive 50 mg./kg./day (approximately one 250 mg. capsule per
each 10 lbs. body weight) in divided doses at 6-hour intervals. In exceptional
cases patients with infections due to moderately resistant organisms may require increased dosage up to 100 mg./kg./day to achieve blood levels inhibiting
the pathogen, but these high doses should be decreased as soon as possible.
Adults with impairment of hepatic or renal function or both may have reduced
ability to metabolize and excrete the drug. In instances of impaired metabolic
processes, dosages should be adjusted accordingly. (See discussion under
Newborn Infants.) Precise control of concentration of the drug in the blood
should be carefully followed in patients with impaired metabolic processes by
the available microtechniques (information available on request).

Children
Dosage of 50 mg./kg./day divided into 4 doses at 6-hour intervals yields blood
levels in the range effective against most susceptible organisms. Severe infections (e.g., bacteremia or meningitis), especially when adequate cerebrospinal
fluid concentrations are desired, may require dosage up to 100 mg./kg./day;
however, it is recommended that dosage be reduced to 50 mg./kg./day as soon

The University of Chicago Law Review

[44:398

CHLOROMYCETIN
(CHLORAMPHENICOL)

as possible. Children with impaired liver or kidney function may retain excessive amounts of the drug.

Newborn Infants
(See section titled "Gray Syndrome" under "Adverse Reactions.")
A total of 25 mg./kg./day in 4 equal doses at 6-hour intervals usually produces
and maintains concentrations in blood and tissues adequate to control most
infections for which the drug is indicated. Increased dosage in these individuals,
demanded by severe infections, should be given only to niaintain the blood
concentration within a therapeutically effective range. After the first two weeks
of life, full-term infants ordinarily may receive up to a total of 50 mg./kg./day
equally divided into 4 doses at 6-hour intervals. These dosage recommendations
are extremely important because blood concentration in all premature infants
and full-term infants under two weeks of age differs from that of other infants.
This difference is due to variations in the maturity of the metabolic functions of

the liver and the kidneys.
When these functions are immature (or seriously impaired in adults), high
concenrrations of the drug are found which tend to increase with succeeding

doses.

Infants and Children with Immature Metabolic Processes
In young infants and other children in whom immature metabolic functions
are suspected, a dose of 25 mg./kg./day will usually produce therapeutic concentrations of the drug in the blood. In this group particularly, the concentration
of the drug in the blood should be carefully followed by microtechniques.
(Information available on request.)

PACKAGE INFORMATION
Kapseals No. 379, Chloromycetin (chloramphenicol capsules), each contain 250
mg. chloramphenicol, supplied in packages of 16 and 100, and Roll-Pak*
of 100.
Capsules No. 477, Chloromycetin (chloramphenicol capsules), each contain 50
mg. chloramphenicol, supplied in packages of 25 and 100.
Capsules No. 480, Chloromycetin (chloramphenicol capsules), each contain 100
mg. chloramphenicol, supplied in packages of 25 and 100.
CHLOROMYCETIN, brand of chloramphenicol, Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.
*Trademark for dispensing package
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